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SUMMARY
New product development (NPD) is critical to a firm’s long term viability. The
ability to formulate, and execute, a comprehensive NPD strategy rests on knowledge
and capabilities that are dispersed throughout the organization. Critical managerial
decisions regarding long term decisions are, by definition, “high level” decisions that
look at the big picture, simply because the details required to make more precise
calculations do not exist or are highly volatile. Instead, allocation decisions are
made in the hope that the “right” product will eventually emerge from the NPD
organization (those people that implement strategy).
This thesis addresses important operational aspects relating to fundamental com-
ponents of any successfully executed NPD strategy: the processes, incentives and
structure of decision rights that should be implemented given the objectives and ca-
pabilities of the firm.
In the first essay (Chapter 2), we outline when a firm might prefer to compensate
members of a NPD project team either, as individuals (e.g. based on their functional
contribution to overall value) or as a team (e.g. based on the overall profit generated).
We find that neither team nor individual based compensation is preferred for all types
of projects. Specifically, when there is higher uncertainty, the firm can benefit by
employing team-based compensation. We discuss the implications of our findings
towards the firm’s ability to pursue different types of projects.
Next, in Chapter 3, we look at the strategic resource allocation processes that
are employed by firms in order to decide whether NPD initiatives get funded or not.
We find that there is not a “one size fits all” resource allocation process that all
firms should employ. Furthermore,we extend this finding by further by providing
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a rationale explaining why even a single firm could benefit by employing multiple
processes internal to the firm.
In Chapter 4, we empirically explore how key managerial levers of the firm (i.e.
incentives, tolerance for failure, and project management structure) affect an individ-
ual’s propensity to invest in a project. Our analysis brings forth several underexplored
and novel aspects. We examine how multiple managerial levers work in concert with
one another (revealing interactions that, to our knowledge, have not been exposed).
We also recognize an important aspect of most (if not all) NPD contexts: the proba-




Few would argue the critical role that new product development (NPD) plays for a
firm’s long term viability. As such, it is important for academics, and practitioners
alike, to understand the factors that enable, or prevent, a firm from implementing
an effective NPD strategy. Said differently, understanding what contributes to the
inability of a project to “gain traction” in one firm, while “taking off” in another
firm, is important.
Scholars have generated quite some knowledge regarding how to choose the ap-
propriate portfolio of projects given the risk preferences and strategic objectives of a
firm (Markowitz 1952, Fox et al. 1984, Loch et al. 2001, Loch and Kavadias 2002,
Girotra et al. 2007, Chao and Kavadias 2009). One aspect of the NPD setting which
is fairly unique is the fact that in many instances the project the firm wishes to im-
plement is largely unknown. In fact this the early phases of product development
have become known as the “fuzzy front end” of product development reflecting the
vast uncertainty that surrounds decisions early on in the process.
Despite the presence of vast uncertainty, critical strategic decisions relating to the
firm’s NPD strategy must be made. These strategic decisions are, more often than
not, made at the higher levels of the hierarchy, whereas the more detailed knowledge
regarding the functional and technical capabilities to achieve specific objectives resides
at lower levels in the hierarchy. The challenge then becomes how can the firm structure
its processes, distribute decision rights, and administer incentives for the various
stakeholders in order to extract the most information and encourage the stakeholders
to act in the best interest of the firm.
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A common objective throughout the subsequent three chapters is to find out when
a particular type of organization structure (processes, decision rights, and incentives–
implicit and explicit) is most appropriate. Such an objective takes a Markowitzian
view of such organization structure in the sense that Markowitz (1952) identified that
there is no optimal portfolio for all individuals, portfolios should be tailored to the
risk preferences of an individual.
The subsequent chapters make the argument that there is no single organization
structure that can be universally applied. rather, each firm must adapt its NPD
organization to its strategic objectives and the context it operates in. Furthermore,
in many instances we make the argument that, more often than not, firms will sell
themselves short by implementing a single process, incentive structure or allocation of
decision rights, across all departments and for all activities within a firm. This thesis
is aimed at contributing to our understanding of under what circumstances a firm
should use the various processes and organizational levers at its disposal to get the
most from the resources within its (loose) control. Figure 1 presents a graphic that
shows how the subsequent chapters are related to one another. Chapter 2 explores the
relationship between a single project manager and the project team, while Chapter 3
raises this analysis to the higher, more strategic, level between the senior management
and the project manager, and finally Chapter 4 evaluates various levers of the senior
management when they are administered to either a single (heavyweight) project
manager with full control over project decisions or to multiple functional managers.
The over-arching picture is that in order to execute NPD strategy we need to under-
stand how to manage the relationships that exist between the multiple stakeholders
in the NPD organization, who are dispersed throughout the organizational hierarchy,
at different levels and with different information. Each chapter explores a different
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Figure 1: A typical NPD organization.
Chapter 2 begins with analysis concerning the project team level of the NPD or-
ganization. In this chapter we recognize the distinct organizational challenges of NPD
projects regarding their execution. Specifically, these projects require specialized com-
petencies, which prompt cross-functional collaboration. Collaboration implies signif-
icant interdependencies between the functions, including both, organizational factors
(i.e. cross-functional coordination), and those arising from the problem structure,
i.e. underlying relationships between the market and technology. Such collaboration
takes place in an uncertain NPD setting, where the effort put forth by each functional
specialist is non-verifiable. Within such a setting, senior management must ensure
that functional specialists contribute towards management’s objective (to maximize
profit). This study evaluates operational implications of incentives that compensate
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specialists based on either, their functional contribution, or team output (project
profit). Specifically, we look at how, project uncertainty, functional interdependen-
cies, and team heterogeneity, affect management’s optimal choice of compensation.
We uncover key sources of tension associated with management’s decisions regarding
compensation: management benefits by employing team incentives for projects with
high uncertainty; however, when there exists substantial diversity regarding the spe-
cialists’ capabilities (cost of effort), functional incentives are preferred. Interestingly,
we show that management benefits by offering specialists that exhibit coordination
synergies, compensation that is based on functional contributions.
In Chapter 3 we look at the strategic level of resource allocation processes within
the firm. There are, two levels of resource allocation associated with the execution of
portfolio management: the strategic level that decides high level programs to fund,
and the more tactical and level associated with the detailed task allocation (more
typically studied by operations scholars). In this chapter, we address the former,
more strategic level of resource allocation. The decision regarding whether to fund a
particular new product development (NPD) initiative has substantial implications for
firm performance. However, at the time resource decisions are made, initiatives are
rarely well defined; decisions rely on specialized knowledge residing at different levels
within the organization. In response, firms employ processes that either emphasize
control over budgeting (top-down), or exploit the detailed knowledge from lower ranks
in the organizational hierarchy (bottom-up). We address the challenges associated
with choosing the “right” resource allocation process (RAP), given two important
factors: (i) the asymmetry of information between stakeholders (how refined is the
knowledge of the initiative’s difficulty), and (ii) the organizational norms that affect
managerial choices, i.e. a firm’s “tolerance for failure” towards managers of NPD
initiatives. Our normative model accounts for the agency setting, and explicates the
features associated with the “right” RAP: how decision rights are distributed between
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stakeholders, and the form of compensation employed. No single RAP is dominant
for all initiatives, even within a single organization. Bottom-up empowerment is
beneficial for initiatives with greater expected difficulty, whereas top-down control is
better for more standard initiatives. We also consider “hybrid” processes and find
that a RAP based on an industry practice known as strategic buckets can offer the
firm better results (higher profitability, and a larger set of opportunities) than either
top-down or bottom-up processes. We offer a theoretical justification for the use of
strategic buckets, and reveal an interesting side effect of organizational norms that
penalize managers for failure: they enable the implementation of “hybrid” processes
without the need for complex and impractical compensation schemes. Implications
for project selection are discussed.
In the final chapter (Chapter 4) we theoretically develop and empirically test
propositions evaluating key factors that affect a project manager’s propensity to in-
vest resources in a NPD project. Most organizations employ collaborative innova-
tion teams to manage innovation projects. While the use of collaborative innovation
teams is a good starting point, an organization’s ability to innovate can be enhanced
by managing risk-taking behavior through monetary incentive schemes and through
an organizational culture that tolerates failure. This paper reports the results of a
controlled laboratory experiment aimed at understanding how tolerance for failure
and incentives impact the decisions of project managers engaged in a collaborative
innovation initiative. We find that subjects invest at a higher level when the reward
is high or when the penalty is low. We also find significant interaction effects between
project control, reward, and penalty. When project control is shared, subjects do not
internalize the effects of reward or penalty as much as they do when control is with
one individual. The implication is that the positive influence of rewards (and the
negative influence of penalties) is dampened when control is shared in a collaborative
innovation team. Finally, we show when and how subjects alter their appetite for
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risk depending on the rewards and penalties offered by the firm. When rewards and
penalties are balanced so that both are high or both are low, subjects tend to exhibit
greater risk appetite. Collectively, these results highlight how the firm can use re-








Firms that engage in new product development (NPD) projects are critically depen-
dent on the ability of cross-functional teams to work collectively towards the common
project objective. However, assuming the de facto existence of such cross-functional
congruence of objectives is simply not realistic. The specialized and uncertain nature
of NPD tasks performed by distinct functions, primarily marketing and engineering,
and the interactions that arise during the NPD process, present challenges regarding
senior management’s ability to establish such congruence.
Cross-functional interactions emerge during a NPD project through multiple sources:
they may be an organizational outcome (i.e. different organizations are more, or less,
effective at managing coordination and collaboration through specific rules or rou-
tines, see Mihm et al. 2003), or they may be environmental factors relating to the
market and technology, which define the particular problem the NPD team is ad-
dressing (Erat and Kavadias 2008, Oraiopoulos and Kavadias 2009). Their presence,
however, poses an important managerial challenge: senior management needs to ac-
count for them when setting objectives, and respective performance plans, for NPD
teams (Feltham and Xie 1994, Loch and Tapper 2002). Faced with such challenges,
senior management resorts to “proper” incentive and compensation structures that
try to align the objectives of the project stakeholders (i.e. senior management and
the functional specialists) towards the common – and beneficial to the firm – profit
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maximization, while accounting for the synergies, or coordination challenges, that
exist between the functional experts (Griffin and Hauser 1996, Dutta at al. 1999,
Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj 2004).
NPD tasks present additional challenges when it comes to rewarding contribution:
tasks are characterized by significant uncertainty associated with their outcome, cou-
pled with the inability to observe and measure the precise amount of intertwined
stakeholder efforts. Thus, the criticality of properly setting the objectives and asso-
ciated rewards becomes of paramount importance. Improper administration of the
objectives and performance plans may result in unnecessary value loss due to intra-
organizational friction or conflict.
Past literature has recorded the challenges of such cross-functional interactions,
with a special emphasis on the classic friction between marketing and engineering
(Allen 1985, Souder and Chakrabarti 1978, Griffin and Hauser 1996). Typical ex-
amples of the tension attributed to this dyad could be: marketing stating that their
contribution is not valued by the firm, or by engineering, or engineering complaining
about unequal compensation of the effort they exert towards the project objective.
However, the majority of the extant literature has focused on recording the causes
of friction, and measuring their effect on project performance. Instead, we aim to
understand how senior management can employ a basic lever, such as the incentives
implied by a compensation plan, to accommodate these realities, (e.g. lack of commu-
nication and coordination), while maximizing firm profits. Therefore, we focus on the
different structures employed in performance plans in an effort to understand which
ones offer the best results. Faced with this situation, the project manager chooses
between two (typical) performance plans employed in practice (Sarin and Mahajan
1991): functional (input) or team (project output) rewards schemes. These two plans
capture a key trade-off: the former offers a more precise signal of effort (i.e. there is
less uncertainty associated with the observed measure), yet it induces a less congruent
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objective; the latter offers a more congruent objective among stakeholders, yet this
comes at the cost of a less precise signal of effort.
Our aim is to investigate how senior management’s preference towards either in-
centive plan depends on four specific characteristics unique to the NPD context: i.
the uncertainty associated with the project; ii. the correlation between the factors
affecting each function’s uncertainty; iii. the coordination exhibited by the NPD or-
ganization; and iv. the team heterogeneity regarding each functions capability (their
cost to exert effort). In particular, we ask the following research question: When will
senior management prefer to offer the specialists a performance plan based on their
(observable) functional contribution, as opposed to one that uses the project outcome
(profits) as the (observable) baseline?
In order to answer this question, we develop a normative model, where a se-
nior manager determines the form of compensation plan (incentives) to offer a cross-
functional NPD team of specialists, in order to maximize the senior manager’s utility
(net profit) for a specific project. The NPD functions are characterized by their
ability to coordinate on the project, while the project itself, is characterized by the
uncertainty associated with the specific market and technology environment. Each
stakeholder makes the following decisions: senior management decides the type, and
magnitude, of incentive plan; and the specialists choose their respective effort level.
At the same time they are subject to two important contextual challenges: the uncer-
tainty regarding the outcome, and the inability to discern the exact causes of either
bad or good outcomes.
Our findings offer several managerial insights regarding the choice between dif-
ferent performance plans. We uncover a key source of tension that exists for senior
management when deciding on the type of incentive to offer. We show that for
projects that have high uncertainty associated with them, senior management prefers
team-based incentives. However, when the capabilities of the project team are diverse
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with respect to each specialists respective cost of effort, senior management would
prefer a functional incentive plan. Thus, we are left with two common traits of an
NPD project team, where each one drives senior management in opposing directions.
Finally, we formally show a paradox regarding team behavior: When a NPD organi-
zation is comprised of functional specialists that coordinate well with one another, a
trait conducive to teamwork, senior management would prefer not to offer team-based
compensation. Said differently, senior management prefers to decouple the incentives
of a NPD project team that exhibits significant synergies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We discuss the relevant literature in
§ 2.2. Then, we introduce our model setup in § 2.3 and we present the model analysis
in § 2.4: in § 2.4.1 we look at the effects of functional interactions when functional
capabilities are homogeneous, both those resulting from organizational coordination
and those representing the market and technology environment; and lastly in § 2.4.2
we discuss the implications of intra-team heterogeneity regarding the functional ca-
pabilities of the specialists on the NPD project team. We offer discussion of the
respective results throughout the analysis, and offer concluding remarks in § 2.5.
2.2 Related Literature
Collaborative product development, specifically the interface of marketing and engi-
neering, has drawn a lot of attention in the literature (see Griffin and Hauser 1996
and references therein). The relevant literature to our problem, is comprised of two
streams of literature that have evolved in parallel: personnel economics (Lazear and
Rosen 1981, Lazear 1995), a field largely developed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s
as a subset of labor economics, and cross-functional communication and conflict in
NPD (Allen 1977, Souder 1978, Griffin and Hauser 1996). Our model conceptualiza-
tion borrows elements from the literature on performance measurement (Baker 1992,
and Feltham and Xie 1994).
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The field of personnel economics (Lazear 1995, Lazear and Oyer 2008) has advo-
cated a firm’s value, in its ability to “provide a mechanism for people to work together
and take advantage of complementarities in their skills and interests.” (Lazear and
Oyer 2008, p. 40). Yet, this work has focused, primarily, on job design of known tasks
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), or activities that are more repetitive in nature and
less related to the realm of NPD organizations. In our study we specifically capture
distinct characteristics (i.e project uncertainty, organizational and market/technology
interactions and intra-team heterogeneity) associated with the functions relating to
NPD project tasks. The focus of personnel economics is further established through
two empirical studies of team incentives and complementarities (Ichniowski et al 1997,
Hamilton et al 2003). We differ from these works because we highlight the opera-
tional effectiveness (e.g. the set of projects a given NPD organization can profitably
undertake) of two different incentive mechanisms, namely a compensation plan based
on each specialist’s functional input, versus one based on the project team output.
There is substantial evidence concerning the level of cross-functional “(dis)harmony”
that exists between the functions involved in an NPD project (Souder and Chakrabarti
1978, Gupta 1986). A number of studies assume that the presence of disharmony pre-
sumes losses to the firm, and as such they aim to reveal how conflicting objectives
translate into losses for the firm. Such studies verify the existence, and even pre-
dominance of, states of “disharmony” between R&D (engineering) and marketing.
Specifically, Souder defines severe cases of disharmony as: “lack of interaction”, “lack
of appreciation”, and “lack of trust”(Souder 1981, p.68, Souder 1988, p.9). Griffin
and Hauser (1996) show that there is widespread empirical evidence of disharmony.
We adopt a different approach. We analyze the decisions of a profit-maximizing se-
nior manager, to explore/question Souder’s (1981) remarks1 that senior management
1“Organizational climates and reward systems often contributed to the unappreciative attitudes.”,
see Souder 1981, p 69.
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contributes to the presence of disharmony, and we show that in some instances, traits
of disharmony may in fact be induced by senior management as a result of their profit
maximizing objective. Thus, our insights are similar in spirit to those of Balasub-
ramanian and Bhardwaj (2004) who show instances of ex-ante, de-facto conflicting
objectives benefitting the profitability of the firm.
Conflicting objectives (Souder 1981, Mihm et al. 2003, Mihm 2009) or the lack of
proper channels of communication (Allen 1977, Moenart and Souder 1996), have been
cited as the source of substantial value loss in NPD projects. Balasubramanian and
Bhardwaj(2004) explicitly consider the conflicting objectives between manufacturing
and marketing, respectively (i.e. manufacturing minimizes cost and marketing maxi-
mizes revenue). They contrast firm profits in a duopoly setting under two settings: a
“coordinated” scenario, where the firm makes both quality and pricing decisions; and
a decentralized setting where manufacturing chooses quality and marketing chooses
price, such that each function bargains in order to reach a “compromise”. They show
that firms can earn higher profits under the decentralized scenario (i.e. implying a
conflict driven outcome) in the presence of competitive pressure. They further pro-
pose that future research should address incentive issues in other contexts, specifically
product development. Our research fills this gap.
2.3 Model Setup
Consider a firm that undertakes a specific NPD project2. The project objectives
require the skills of cross-functional experts, namely, marketing and engineering spe-
cialists. These specialists need to collaborate in order to complete the project and
ultimately generate value for the firm. In order to retain tractability while still teas-
ing out the effects of cross-functional collaboration, we assume the team consists of
two functional specialists, and a “senior manager”.
2We employ the terms NPD initiative or NPD project interchangeably.
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2.3.1 Functional roles within the NPD team
Each specialist contributes to the total value of the initiative through individual effort
put towards their respective functional activities (e.g. marketing conducts consumer
research and market analysis, while engineering develops, tests, and integrates prod-
uct technology). In order for each expert to achieve a specific contribution, s/he
exerts effort, ei i ∈ {t,m}. We assume that the actual effort the specialists put into
the project activities is non-verifiable to represent an important NPD reality: prod-
uct development involves complex and highly specialized tasks, where observing the
actions of an expert does not allow a “non-expert” to discern the amount of effort
the expert puts into the project. In other words, even if a project manager believes
that a functional specialist is not working hard, his/her claim would not stand on its
own in a court of law3.
Additionally, we assume that the correspondence between effort and the ex-post
realization of the functional contribution, is not a one to one mapping, even for the
specialists themselves. This reflects another key property of NPD activities: despite
aspirations of technology attaining a certain level of performance, and engineering
specialists exerting effort to achieve it, they may over or under-shoot their objec-
tive. We represent the correspondence between functional contribution and effort
as vi = ei + εi, where εi, i ∈ {m, t} are normally distributed with a mean of zero,
standard deviations of σi
4, and a correlation ρ. In an NPD context, σi represents the
uncertainty experienced at the functional level, for the specific project. A reasonable
assumption would be that, functional activities undertaken in well-known domains,
experience less uncertainty (i.e. they are more incremental), while those that are not
3Our argument closely follows standard structural assumptions in the incomplete contracts liter-
ature (Hart and Moore 1988).
4Based on the incomplete contracts literature, in our model, the fact that the specialist’s effort
is not observable, is not as critical as the fact that the ex-post contributions can not be traced back
to effort. In other words, the only verifiable observations are the functional value contributions, vi;
which, are themselves random variables, vi ∼ N(ei, σ2i ).
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so well defined (i.e. are more radical) will have a higher degree of uncertainty. At the
same time we recognize that cross-functional NPD tasks may lead to outcomes that
are not only influenced by function-specific knowledge, but also by the relationship
between market and technology “environmental factors” that lie outside of the direct
control of the functional specialists. We capture such dependencies by the correlation
between εm and εt, which eventually define the correlation between vm and vt.
The functional contribution of each specialist (vm and vt for marketing and en-
gineering) represents the cumulative output of all function-specific activities. As an
example, a bicycle company that develops a new racing bike (the project), may con-
sider metric(s) of the functional value contribution for the engineering specialists that
relate to the strength (torsional rigidity), or weight of a carbon fiber frame. Similarly,
they may employ metrics for the marketing experts such as the number of new or
confirmed customers, or the size of their distribution channels.
2.3.2 Revenue generation and firm cost
The functional contributions to the NPD project define the firm revenue. We ac-
knowledge that NPD outcomes are not simply the “sum of the functional parts”, but
they rely on a significant amount of interdependencies (Dutta et al. 1999) between
the functions engaged in the initiative. Some of these interdependencies are driven by
exogenous factors (captured by the correlation between the realized functional con-
tributions), but others emerge from the organizational rules and routines associated
with collaboration. Previous research has already made the case that organizational
interactions between the functional specialists may either create significant synergies,
or may be the source of substantial costs. The effects of such functional interactions
have been shown to be both, a potential dimension of competitive advantage, and a
key determinant of project success (Gupta 1985, Griffin and Hauser 1996). In line
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with this literature, we model the NPD project revenue R, as a function of the contri-
butions made by the functional specialists, as well as the organizational interactions
between the two functions for the particular initiative: R(vm, vt, b) = vm + vt + bvmvt.
Thus, b ∈ R reflects the extent of coordination exhibited by the NPD organization.
The interactions between the functional specialists may be complementary (b > 0),
however we also include cases where the functional experts do not “harmoniously”
coordinate with one another (b < 0) (Souder 1981). The NPD literature has re-
peatedly recorded the fact that coordination requires significant costs, such as the
intensive and frequent communication, or unnecessary redesign efforts resulting from
oscillatory nature of engineering change orders between NPD sub-groups (Mihm et al.
2003, Loch and Terwiesch 2008). In summary, our model allows for both positive (e.g.
synergies) and negative (e.g. costly coordination or excessive meetings) value effects:
in certain cases, the total value generated is greater than the sum of the individual
functional contributions; on the flip-side, even if a function is able to “do all the right
things” (e.g. marketing can gain substantial distribution and conduct effective mar-
keting), the inability to effectively communicate the consumer needs to engineering,
leading to inadequate design, harms the firm’s ability to appropriate returns from the
project.
The resulting functional contributions have resource implications for the firm. The
firm’s cost is a result of the NPD team’s respective contributions. We represent it





representation of the firm’s cost echoes that of prior marketing models, where a higher
“quality” contribution tends to be more costly (Moorthy 1984). Thus, the potential
gross profit of the initiative is Π(vm, vt, b) = R(vm, vt, b) − cf (vm, vt). The quadratic
nature of the cost captures the limiting effects of effort on value creation, i.e. no
function can create infinite value through their effort.
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2.3.3 The need for incentives
As we have indicated in § 2.3.1, the functional specialists exert personal effort in order
to realize their respective functional contributions. This effort comes at a private cost
ci(ei) = cie
2
i /2, i ∈ {m, t}. We follow related literature on collaborative innovation
(Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj 2004, Bhaskaran and Krishnan 2009) and use a
quadratic functional form to capture this cost of effort. Such cost is private, as
it only impacts each expert’s utility; however, the magnitude of the impact to the
expert’s utility is observed by all stakeholders (both experts and the firm)5. The
parameter ci represents each expert’s respective capability, such that an expert with
a high capability has a lower cost of effort, for the same expected contribution, as
opposed to an expert with low capability. As a result of functional contributions (vm
and vt) being stochastically determined, effort being non-verifiable, and each specialist
incurring a private cost of effort, it becomes imperative that the firm employ some
form of incentive compensation to ensure the proper effort commitment (Holmstrom
1979). Under such a compensation plan, each specialist must at least expect to earn
their reservation utility (e.g. their outside employment option) U6.
2.3.4 Incentives and the choice of performance plan
The design of the performance plan for a NPD team is a central decision for the senior
management of a firm. Senior management has the discretion to choose between
different methods of rewarding the functional specialists. Thus, the main decision
is how to best allocate remunerations for the NPD team members in the context of
a specific initiative (σi, ρ), the capabilities of the NPD organization (ci), and the
organizational ability to coordinate (b). We restrict our attention to two performance
5We remind the reader that although the parameter ci is known the effort can not be verified,
and thus the problem remains one of moral hazard.
6In our presentation, we normalize the reservation utility to zero. In an associated technical
report we show that our results carry over to the general case of non-zero reservation utilities. It is
readily available from the authors.
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plans that are documented as typical forms7 of compensation schemes in matrix,
project-based or strictly functional-based organizations (Allen 2000): i) Functional
incentives (F ) - The firm bases each specialist’s performance plan solely on their own
functional contribution; or ii) Team incentives (P ) - The firm bases their performance
plan on the combined outcome of the initiative (profits).
If the firm chooses to implement a performance plan based on functional incentives,
each specialist receives compensation: wfi+kfivi where wfi represents the fixed wage
(salary) portion of the plan, and kfi linearly parameterizes the bonus based on the
realized contribution. This yields utility for each specialist: Ufi = wfi +kfivi− ci(ei).
However, if the firm chooses to compensate the specialists using team incentives, each
one receives the same bonus: wpi + kpΠ, where Π represents the gross profits, wpi is
the fixed wage offered to each specialist i and kp linearly parameterizes the common
bonus plan. This yields utility for each specialist equal to Upi = wpi + kpΠ− ci(ei).
Definition 1. Stakeholder utility
1. Under team incentives (P ):
(a) Each manager i ∈ {m, t} has expected utility:




(b) Senior management’s expected utility is:
Eεm,εt(Ups) = ups = (1−2kp) (em + et + bemet + bρσmσt − (e2m + e2t + σ2m + σ2t ))
2. Under functional incentives (F ):
(a) Each manager i ∈ {m, t} has expected utility:
7Formally, we restrict ourselves to two different types of linear contract. The assumption of linear
contracts is common in the literature, as it is a stylized representation of bonuses commonly used
in practice.
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Eεm,εt(Ufi) = ufi = kfei − (cie2i ) /2
(b) Senior management’s expected utility is:






Then, the objective of the firm and the relevant constraints are as follows:












ei = arg max
ei
upi








ei = arg max
ei
ufi





Figure 6 shows a timeline that explicitly outlines the sequence of events and
decisions in our model.
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Senior management dictates an initiative (σ2i , ρ) for the NPD team (marketing and engi-
neering). This defines: σi, b, ci, ρ
Senior management chooses the type of performance plan, by choosing between:
i. “Functional incentives” (F ): Bonus is based on each specialist’s functional input.
ii. “Team incentives” (P ): Bonus is based on the project team’s output.
Senior management designs the performance plan by choosing:
i. wfi, kfi, i∈ {m,t} for functional incentives and
ii. wpi, kp, i∈ {m,t} for team incentives.
Each specialist simultaneously chooses their utility maximizing choice of effort em and et.
Senior management and the functional specialists realize the functional contributions vm
and vt.
The profits are generated based on the functional contributions and bonuses are dis-
tributed.
Figure 1 The sequence of decisions and events.
(a) Each manager i∈ {m,t} has expected utility:
Eεm,εt(Ufi) = ufi = kfei− (cie2i )/2
(b) Senior management’s expected utility is:
Eεm,εt(Ufs) = ufs = (1− kfm)em +(1− kft)et + bemet + bρσmσt− (e2m + e2t +σ2mσ2t )
Then, the objective of the firm and the relevant constraints are as follows:































Figure 1 shows a timeline that explicitly outlines the sequence of events and decisions in our
model.
Figure 2: The sequence of decisions and events.
2.4 Model Analysis
In this section we present our analysis on senior management’s choice of performance
plan given a particular NPD initiative (σ2i , ρ). In addition to outlining the opti-
mal choice of performance plan we delineate the set of initiatives that the firm can
profitably pursue. In doing so, we provide a comprehensive assessment of which per-
formance plan is applicable for various NPD organizations (e.g. those with NPD
organizations that enjoy benefits of synergistic coordination, or those that incur sub-
stantial cost in order to coord nate); and the potential initiatives the company faces
(e.g. NPD projects that extend existing product lines through slight changes, as
opposed to more radical efforts that aim to introduce completely new products).
2.4.1 Homogeneous capabilities
We consider the fully symmetric case, ct = cm = c and σt = σm = σ (in § ?? we relax
the assumption of symmetric costs). The expected profit of the firm under team and
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functional incentives, and the expected utility of the functional specialists under each
respective incentive plan becomes:
ups = (1− 2kp) (em + et + bemet + bρσ2 − (e2m + e2t + 2σ2))
upi = kp (em + et + bemet + bρσ
2 − (e2m + e2t + 2σ2))− (ce2i ) /2
ufs = (1− kfm)em + (1− kft)et + bemet + bρσ2 − (e2m + e2t + 2σ2)
ufi = kfei − (cie2i ) /2
We use the sub-game perfect, Nash equilibrium concept to evaluate the effort
choices of the stakeholders of the NPD initiative. Backward induction dictates that
we first analyze the strategic interaction between the functional specialists, in order
to determine their utility maximizing decisions given a performance plan; then we
solve for the contract parameters kp and kf that yield the firm’s (non-negative) profit
maximizing solution, finally, we solve for the profit maximizing choice of performance
plan P or F .
2.4.1.1 The actions of the functional specialists.
Under a performance plan that promotes team incentives, both specialists receive
a bonus based on the total profit of the initiative, Πp. Consequently, the functional
specialists directly depend on one another in order to maximize their respective utility.
By contrast, under a functional incentive plan, each of the specialists is compensated
solely based on their own contribution, (i.e. vm or vt), and they need not be concerned
with the actions of the other agent; such actions do not directly affect their own
compensation. Similarly, under functional incentives, each specialist is not explicitly
concerned with the cost of the firm because, once again, as shown in Definition 1 the
firm cost does not appear in their utility. However, note that these are only direct
implications for the specialists. The actions of the other specialist and the firm’s
cost have an indirect effect on the specialists: senior management accounts for the
actions of both specialists, and the firm cost, when choosing a particular compensation
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structure. We make this more precise in Lemma 2.
In the following lemma we present the symmetric best response functions under
each type of performance plan. We then discuss how these determine the equilibrium
actions. (All proofs can be found in the Appendix).
Lemma 1. The equilibrium effort of the specialists.
• Under a functional incentive plan each (symmetric) specialist exerts the same









• Under a team incentive plan each specialist’s best response action is: epi(epj, kp, b) =
kp(1+bej)
c+2kp
, which results in equilibrium effort levels: e∗p(kp, b, c) =
kp
c−kp(b−2)
Lemma 1 describes how the different parameters of the project impact the ac-
tions of the specialists for each respective performance plan. As expected, when the
specialists operate under a functional incentive plan they do not consider the action
(effort) of the other specialist, and thus their effort level is solely based on their per-
sonal capability (c) and the incentives offered (kfi). Additionally, their choice does
not depend directly on the organizational interdependencies (b); such organizational
factors only influence their choice through senior management’s choice of kf .
However, under a team-based incentive plan, the specialists do consider both the
organizational interdependencies and the actions of the other specialist. Only in
the absence of any interdependency (i.e. b = 0), do we observe that the specialists
are not concerned with each other’s actions, similar to the choices under functional
incentives. However, despite the fact that b = 0, each specialist’s action under a team-
based incentive plan is different when compared to the action they would take under
a functional incentive plan. This is a result of the specialist’s objective under team
incentives being more congruent with the objective of the firm than the specialist’s
objective under functional incentives.
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Note that even under team incentives, the specialists do not directly consider
the amount of uncertainty associated with the initiative; their effort choices are in-
dependent of the variance (σ2) associated with the initiative. This stems from our
assumption that all stakeholders are risk neutral. However, the project uncertainty
does factor into the specialists’ equilibrium indirectly: project uncertainty enters
their equilibrium actions through senior management’s choice of optimal incentives.
Lemma 2 describes the optimal incentives for each performance plan.
Lemma 2. The firm’s incentive decision.
Define the following quantities: β , b− 2, γ , 1 + 2βσ2, and ξ = 1
2
(2− bρ)σ2.
• The optimal functional incentive plan is such that:







• The optimal team incentive plan is such that:





when σ < σ̄,
then k∗p solves G(kp, ·) = β2γk3p−3βcγk2p+2c2(1+β+γ)kp−c2(1+2cξ) = 0
• w∗f = w∗p = 0
Lemmas 1 and 2 confirm that when the specialists are symmetric with respect to
their capabilities and uncertainties, both their efforts (e·) and the bonus compensation
(k·) offered by the firm will also be symmetric. Given this observation we drop the
subscript i throughout (except where necessary for clarity). Lemma 2 shows that the
project uncertainty (σ2) affects the specialist’s committed effort indirectly when team
incentives are employed. That is, it does so through senior management’s choice of
incentives, and more specifically, through the magnitude of the bonus compensation.
However, the senior management only takes the project uncertainty into account in
team-based incentive plans. This results from the fact that the stakeholders are all
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assumed to be risk neutral, and therefore any uncertainty implications arise from
non-linearities in the project profit; functional incentive plans do not account for the
latter.
2.4.1.2 The choice between incentive plans.
Proposition 1 outlines senior management’s preferred incentive plan in the face of
project uncertainty.
Proposition 1. The firm’s choice of performance plans.
There exists an uncertainty threshold σ̄ ∈ R such that, for initiatives with low
(market/technology) uncertainty (σ < σ̄), the firm implements functional in-
centives, whereas for initiatives exhibiting high uncertainty (σ > σ̄), the firm
implements team incentives.
There are two major factors that hinder the firm’s ability to achieve maximum
profit: the strategic interaction between the specialists, and the project uncertainty.
The first only plays a role when team incentives are employed, as discussed in Lemma
1. However, project uncertainty affects profitability under both incentive plans, and
this is where we realize the advantage of team incentives. As a result of the congruence
between the specialists’ and senior management’s objectives under team incentives,
all stakeholders share in any benefit or loss associated with the project uncertainty.
However, under a functional incentive plan, senior management bears the full benefit
or loss associated with the project uncertainty. Thus, when the project uncertainty is
low, senior management marginally benefits from the functional specialists sharing the
uncertainty, but senior management bears the losses associated with a lower effort due
to the specialists’ strategic interaction. Yet, under a team incentive plan, as project
uncertainty increases, the benefits from sharing the exposure to uncertainty, outweigh
the losses from strategic interaction and a team incentive plan becomes the preferred
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Figure 3: The firm implements functional incentives for the lightly shaded region
and team incentives for the darker shaded region (dimensioned by the bold arrows).
Functional incentives allow the firm to profitably pursue projects falling within the
region outlined by the dashed line, while team incentives allow the firm to pursue
projects in both shaded regions.
Initiatives are not 
profitable under either


































depending on the Initiative Uncertainty
and Organizational Coordination
choice. The following Corollary describes the managerial insights from implementing
the optimal performance plans.
Corollary 1. The set of feasible initiatives
The set of NPD initiatives the firm can implement under functional incentives
is strictly smaller than that under team incentives.
Another important insight relates to the set of feasible initiatives. The set of
feasible initiatives represents all the projects that senior management could pursue,
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and still expect to earn non-negative utility, under a particular type of incentive
plan. Figure 3 presents a graphical representation of these sets in a σ2 − b plane. As
shown in Proposition 1, there exists a maximal level of uncertainty beyond which an
initiative is deemed unprofitable, irrespective of the incentive structure employed. We
find that the firm can always accommodate more uncertainty with team incentives
than with functional ones. The intuition behind this result is similar to that of
Proposition 1. The benefits of congruent objectives allows stakeholders to share the
project uncertainty, which serves to moderate effort more effectively in the presence
of high uncertainty.
2.4.1.3 The effect of functional interdependencies on the choice of incentive plan.
Proposition 2 lays the foundation for understanding how the relationship between
the environmental factors, i.e. the uncertainty faced by the marketing specialist and
that faced by the engineering specialist (i.e. ρ), affect senior management’s choice of
performance plan.
Proposition 2. Effect of interdependencies on compensation and profit.
• Under functional incentives, the optimal compensation plan k∗f is unaffected by
the correlation ρ.
• Under team incentives, the optimal compensation plan k∗p is decreasing (increas-
ing) in the correlation ρ when b > 0 (b < 0).
• Under functional incentives, senior management’s optimal expected utility u∗fs
is increasing (decreasing) in the correlation ρ when b > 0 (b < 0).
• Under team incentives, senior management’s optimal expected utility u∗ps is in-
creasing (decreasing) in the correlation ρ when b > 0 (b < 0).
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When senior management employs a functional incentive plan, the effort choices
made by the specialists do not take the organizational interactions into consideration.
However, as outlined in Lemma 2, senior management does consider both types of
interdependencies: organizational interactions (b), and the correlation between the
environmental factors (ρ). As such, senior management aims to induce behavior
that is sensitive to the impact from these interdependencies. Thus, Proposition 2
shows that under functional incentives, senior management does adjust the bonus
offered to the specialists according to the level of organizational coordination, but
does not adjust the bonus according to interdependencies between environmental
factors. This is a result of how the correlation figures into the firm profits under
functional incentives: the benefits and losses associated with the external environment
do not interact with the actions of the specialists (i.e. neither kf nor ei is present in
the term bρσmσt in Definition 1) and thus, given the risk neutral behavior of senior
management this term does not factor into their decision.
However, the effects on team incentives are different. Although the directional
effect of b is the same as under functional incentives, the way in which it figures
into each specialist’s effort choice is distinctly different: First, under team incentives,
Lemma 1 showed that the specialists consider the organizational coordination when
choosing effort; Second, senior management and the specialists share the benefits and
losses associated with the direct effect of organizational factors (i.e. the term bemet),
and the interaction between the level of organizational coordination and the correla-
tion between external environmental factors, (i.e. the term bρσmσt). The fact that the
stakeholders share the benefits and losses that stem from organizational coordination
and the relationships between uncertain environmental aspects, drives the resulting
relationship between correlation and optimal bonus. When senior management ac-
counts for the correlation, it is critical to note whether organizational coordination
exhibits positive or negative effects, since the correlation serves to magnify the value
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created or lost through such coordination activities. The following corollary outlines
how the interdependencies impact the projects that senior management is profitably
able to pursue with the marketing and engineering specialists within their NPD or-
ganization.
Corollary 2. The effect of interdependencies on the set of feasible
initiatives
• The set of NPD initiatives the firm can implement is increasing in b.
• The set of NPD initiatives the firm can implement is increasing (decreasing) in
ρ when b > 0 (b < 0).
Corollary 1 shows how team incentives allow the firm to pursue a broader set of
projects than it could if it only implemented functional incentives. Now, Corollary
2 adds to this by noting the effects of interdependencies on the feasible set. Corol-
lary 2 follows directly from the directional results of Proposition 2, whereby when
profitability is increasing so too is the feasible set. We capture the effects of the or-
ganizational coordination on senior management’s choice of performance plan in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 3. The choice of compensation plan and interdependencies.
For a given initiative (σ2, ρ), there exists a lower, and an upper, threshold level of
organizational coordination b, b̄ ∈ R, such that:
• When b > b̄, the firm employs functional incentives.
• When b ∈ [b, b̄], the firm employs team incentives.
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Figure 4: The firm implements functional incentives for the lightly shaded region and
project incentives for the darker shaded region (as dimensioned by the bold arrows).
Functional incentives can only profitably implement projects that lie in the region
above the dotted line, while team incentives are only profitable for those projects
that lie between the lower and upper dashed lines (as dimensioned by the dashed
arrows).
Proposition 3 extends the intuition of Proposition 2 and is graphically presented
in Figure 4. When we consider both dimensions of interdependencies, b and ρ, we
show that for both incentive plans, increased organizational coordination has bene-
fits regarding profitability. However, as coordination increases, senior management’s
preference towards functional incentives increases as well. To see this we can look at
the case when the correlation is zero (i.e. the left-most portion of Figure 4); even in
the absence of any correlation (i.e. the term bρσ2 in Definition 1 plays no role), there
exist direct effects of organizational coordination (i.e. the term bemet in Definition 1).
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When the coordination exhibits synergies (b > 0), under team incentives the direct
benefits are diluted through the strategic interaction and the shared profit between
stakeholders. As such, under functional incentives we find that senior management
enjoys a greater increase in relative utility than under team incentives. This suggests
that senior management would prefer to employ functional incentives when the co-
ordination is positive. However, the reverse is true when the coordination between
functions is costly. In such situations, the fact that the impact is diluted through the
strategic interaction, and shared by all stakeholders, benefits senior management. In
summary, when senior management observes behavior, on the part of the specialists,
that is conducive to teamwork (i.e. functions that coordinate well to create syner-
gies), management would prefer to employ functional incentives that act to decouple
the efforts of each specialist.
Once we allow for interdependencies between functional uncertainties (ρ > 0), we
see that the the effects of coordination are magnified. In other words, as the uncer-
tainty associated with the underlying market and technology become more closely
interrelated (↑ ρ), any organizational synergies exhibited by the functional specialists
are further magnified such that senior management’s preference for functional incen-
tives is stronger. Likewise, for costly coordination, as the linkage between market and
technology uncertainty becomes stronger, senior management’s preference for team
incentives becomes stronger as depicted in Figure 4.
2.4.2 The effect of NPD team diversity
Thus far we have considered functional specialists with symmetric capabilities (i.e.
the same private cost of effort). Our assumption has enabled us to illustrate key
trade-offs that arise when choosing the form of compensation, even in the case of
symmetric functional specialists. Yet, in reality NPD teams will likely exhibit some
asymmetry with regards to their functional capability. It may be the case that the
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technology already exists, yet hasn’t been introduced to a particular market (which
would imply a lower cost of effort for engineering and a higher cost of effort for
marketing) or vice versa. In this section we consider functional specialists with het-
erogeneous capabilities, and examine the implications of this team-diversity factor on
senior management’s choice of performance plan. Note that, as our example suggests,
we do not associate the term “capability” with a good or a bad specialist. Instead,
we conceptualize the capability as being a property of the strategic initiative itself: a
low (high) capability specialist is the same as saying that the specialist faces a high
(low) cost to search the solution space that characterizes the product development
problem. In order to retain tractability, we revert to the case where the actions of the
specialists do not exhibit any correlation. We represent a high capability (low cost)
specialist’s personal cost of effort by c̄(1 − δ), and likewise, the low capability (high
cost) specialist has a personal cost of: c̄(1 + δ). Thus, c̄ denotes the mean capability
of the NPD team and δ denotes the dispersion of capabilities. Proposition 4 discusses
the profitability of the firm under the different incentive plans. It compares a cross
functional team that has symmetric functional specialists, both with capability c̄, to
a team with diverse capabilities, c̄(1− δ) and c̄(1 + δ).
Proposition 4. Profitability and diverse capabilities.
For a given NPD initiative (σ2, ρ)
• Under a functional incentive plan, the expected profit of the firm increases in
the diversity of the project team capabilities (δ).
• Under a team incentive plan, there exists a threshold ĉ ∈ R such that for c̄ ≤ ĉ
the expected profit of the firm is non-increasing in the team diversity (δ), and
for c̄ > ĉ the expected profit of the firm increases in δ.
Under functional incentives the firm has the ability to tailor incentives to each
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function’s capability, while still ensuring that the specialists will exert enough ef-
fort. In other words, the intuition built in Lemma 2 still holds: specialists are only
concerned with their own contribution and resulting compensation; as such, senior
management offers a positive bonus for all feasible initiatives8 and the specialists al-
ways exert positive effort (i.e. they are never driven to their participation constraint).
In the absence of any strategic interaction, the firm can always improve its profits
when the specialists differ in their capabilities. Why is this the case? Because senior
management can take advantage of the higher capability specialist. A higher capa-
bility implies a lower cost of effort, the benefits of one additional unit of effort from
the low cost specialist are greater than the equivalent losses incurred by the high cost
specialist, yielding an additional gain for senior management. It then results that the
high capability specialist always exerts more effort as induced by senior management.
Team incentives are different. Under team incentives the participation constraint
of the specialists may bind. In the case of diverse capabilities, if the participation
constraint is binding, it is always the low capability specialist who has a binding par-
ticipation constraint. Under a binding participation constraint, the bonus offered to
both specialists (k∗p), is determined by the utility of the specialist(s) whose participa-
tion constraint is binding. The resulting k∗p that senior management offers is linear
in the capability of the specialist(s) with a binding participation constraint. From
Lemma 1 shows, if k∗p is linear in capability, then the equilibrium effort is independent
of capability. As expected, the same holds true for the average capability, i.e. the
effort exerted by each specialist is independent of the average capability. Still, the
effort exerted, depends on the dispersion of capabilities. This results from the fact
that k∗p changes according to the efforts of both specialists, and with diverse capabil-
ities the high capability specialist always exerts a higher level of effort (as s/he earns
8Recall, feasible initiatives are those projects that the firm expects to earn non-negative net
profits.
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a utility surplus by doing so). Thus, when the effort is high, the utility that senior
management gains from the additional effort put forth by the higher capability spe-
cialist is less than the loss of utility surplus given to the higher capability specialist.
As such, with high average capability, any increase in the dispersion of capabilities
will cause a decrease in senior management’s utility. For the opposite case, senior
management gains more by exploiting the high capability specialist. Thus, senior
management earns greater surplus when the dispersion increases.
The following Lemma, provides normative reasoning for empirical findings relating
to the harmony that exists between the functional specialists on the NPD project
team.
Lemma 3. Compensation and capability dispersion.
When the firm employs functional incentives for a diverse NPD team:
• A specialist with higher capability, exerts more effort than the lower capability
one.
• A specialist with higher capability expects to receive a higher utility than the




Lemma 3 sheds light on the previous empirical findings relating to the friction
between marketing and engineering experts within a NPD project team (Souder 1981
and 1988, Griffin and Hauser 1996). As discussed in § 3.2, such studies have found the
existence, and even predominance of, states of “harmony” or “disharmony” between







fj, i.e. whoever exerts more effort is rewarded more. Lemma
3 makes the case that, such empirical observations, may be the result of optimal,
profit maximizing decisions on the part of senior management. Lemma 3 is graphically
depicted in Figure 2.4.2, showing regions of harmony, where the higher compensation
is garnered by the specialist exerting more effort; and those of disharmony, where
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Figure 5: In order to achieve profit maximizing results, the firm may optimally
provide incentives that induce disharmony among the specialists. The respective
effort and utility of the high (low) capability specialist is denoted by eH (eL) and uH
(uL), respectively.
           Harmony
eH>eL implies uH>uL 
        Disharmony
eH>eL implies uL>uH





















the higher compensation goes to the specialist who exerts less effort. As stated in
Lemma 3 and shown in Figure 2.4.2, there is a greater degree of disharmony when
the average capability of the specialists is low and when the dispersion of capabilities
(diversity) is high.
Proposition 5. The impact of project teams with diverse capabilities.
• When the NPD team is comprised of specialists with diverse capability levels,
the relative advantage of functional incentives increases.
• In the extreme case, as δ → 1, functional incentives become dominant over the
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entire range of profitable initiatives.
Proposition 5 captures an interesting source of tension faced by senior manage-
ment: in an NPD context many project teams face significant levels of uncertainty.
Our findings outlined in Propositions 1 and 3 would advocate team incentive struc-
tures in such situations. However, NPD projects rarely are staffed with functional
specialists with identical capabilities; then, our results in Proposition 5 would suggest
that senior management move towards employing functional incentive plans. This
apparent tension bolsters the argument that firms need to be especially cognizant
of both, the type of problems the NPD team faces (e.g. more radical or incremental
projects), but also the characteristics of their organization: their ability to coordinate
with one another, and their relative capabilities to accomplish their respective tasks.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this study we develop a model to address under what conditions a firm would
prefer to offer a cross-functional team of marketing and engineering experts either an
incentive plan that rewards functional inputs, or one that rewards the project team
output. We recognize that such senior management decisions need to account for
a set of important factors: i) the organizational complementarities or coordination
losses, i.e. the ability of marketing and engineering to create synergies or the friction
between them resulting in added costs; and ii) the interdependencies of the underlying
market and technology factors the team faces, i.e. how interrelated are the marketing
and engineering value contributions. The key trade-off that senior management faces
is that, while functional incentives offer a clearer signal of each functional specialist’s
effort, the effort of each specialist is decoupled, thus they do not account for the impact
to the total project outcome. Alternatively, team-based incentive plans encourage the
functional specialists to think more holistically, such that they are more congruent
with senior management’s objectives (i.e. the maximum value for the specific NPD
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project). Yet, they offer a noisier signal regarding the effort exerted by the specialists,
since they base compensation on the profit, which encompasses the total uncertainty
associated with the project value, and they induce the functional specialists to act
strategically (i.e. to “game” one another).
We model this trade off in a principal multi-agent setting, where senior manage-
ment faces moral hazard regarding the cross-functional effort exerted towards the
execution of a NPD project. We analyze the problem in two distinct steps: first, we
look at the optimal compensation plan for a NPD project when the functional special-
ists exhibit similar capabilities to identify the effects of the aforementioned tensions;
then we examine the effect of diversity regarding each function’s private cost of effort
(each function’s capability).
Three major insights emerge from our analysis regarding the preferred compen-
sation plan; the first two concern homogeneous project teams, while the last relates
to a project team that has heterogeneous functional capabilities. First, we show that
for higher uncertainty projects, i.e. a high degree of uncertainty associated with the
realized functional contributions, senior management prefers to offer each specialist
a team incentive plan. Such an incentive plan is able to capitalize on both establish-
ing more congruent objectives among the stakeholders (senior management and the
functional specialists), and sharing the uncertainty associated with the initiative be-
tween senior management and the functional specialists. Thus, team based incentives
moderate the effort expenditures based on the amount of uncertainty. Additionally, a
team-based incentive plan enables the firm to pursue a broader range of projects than
a functional incentive plan would. Said differently, only when employing team-based
incentives, can the firm pursue initiatives with higher uncertainty.
Second, we find an interesting relationship between senior management’s optimal
decision regarding compensation and the characteristics of the NPD project team.
When senior management is considering a team comprised of functional specialists
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who exhibit coordination synergies, a characteristic often associated with well func-
tioning teams, management prefers to offer the specialists compensation that rewards
their functional contribution. Said differently, team incentives benefit senior man-
agement when a team does not exhibit positive synergies, yet if they do exhibit such
synergies, senior management would prefer not to reward the specialists as a team.
The intuition behind this result is the fact that under functional incentives, senior
management reaps the full benefit (or burden) associated with the value created (or
lost) due to coordination. However, under team incentives, this value is shared among
all stakeholders, and its effect is diluted through the strategic interaction that takes
place between the functional specialists. In the end the benefit of coordination makes
preferences for functional incentives stronger. Interestingly, functional interdependen-
cies associated with the market and technology uncertainty (i.e. the correlation ρ),
magnify the effect of positive or negative organizational coordination. Thus, senior
management will aim to decouple the incentives offered to a team of highly coordi-
nated marketing and engineering specialists, who work on a project where the market
and technology are closely linked.
Third, we find that when a NPD team is characterized by diverse capabilities
(cost of effort) to add value through their functional contributions, senior manage-
ment prefers to offer a functional incentive plan. In other words, the ability to tailor
incentives to functional capability allows senior management to extract greater ben-
efit from the more effective specialist, i.e. the specialist with a lower private cost
of effort. Interestingly, such a tailored functional incentive plan uncovers a second
order effect that may provide an alternative explanation for the widespread find-
ings of previous literature (Souder 1981) regarding the dis-harmony recorded in the
marketing-engineering dyad (Griffin and Hauser 1996): we show that the firm may
optimally induce pay-for-performance inequity between the functional specialists. In
other words, we establish that depending on the average NPD team capability and
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the diversity level, it can optimally happen that the firm offers lower compensation
to the specialist that contributes more effort; an outcome that under many settings
would create feelings of “unfairness”. Our finding not only lends insight to the ob-
served tensions between the functions, but it also serves as a cautionary signal for
interpreting self-reported measures of “internal performance” e.g. team member sat-
isfaction (Sarin and Mahajan 1991) with the actual performance of the project for
the firm.
Finally, when we compile our findings, we observe that senior management faces an
interesting tension, often NPD project teams face both, projects with high uncertainty
and project teams will have diverse capabilities. Senior management can benefit by
employing team incentives when facing highly uncertain projects, yet the more diverse
the team capabilities are the more senior management could benefit from offering
functional incentives. This tension highlights the importance of senior management’s
ability to understand, the type of projects their NPD teams face, the individual




RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESSES FOR NEW
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: EMPOWERMENT,
CONTROL...OR BOTH? THE VALUE OF STRATEGIC
BUCKETS
3.1 Introduction
The decision of whether or not to fund a particular strategic initiative can have sub-
stantial implications for the firm’s viability (Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Cooper et
al. 2001, Chao and Kavadias 2009). At the time such a decision is made, the initia-
tive may not be fully defined, or precisely understood. Knowledge regarding what it
takes to execute a specific initiative is dispersed across different levels of the firm’s
hierarchy creating significant asymmetries of information. As a result, the decision
process (i.e which decisions are made by whom) that senior management implements,
influences both whether the initiative is funded, and if it is, what the funding level
will be. The fact that resource allocation processes (RAP) shape what initiatives a
firm funds is not, by itself, new (Bower 1970, Burgelman 1983, Bower and Gilbert
2005). Yet, understanding how the chosen processes determine which initiatives the
firm funds, is an important operational element that determines strategy execution.
The resource allocation processes employed in practice fall within two broad cat-
egories. In a top-down process, senior management dictates fixed levels of resources
for middle management (i.e. project managers) to oversee, whereas in bottom-up
processes project managers are granted decision rights (Aghion and Tirole 1997) to
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determine the right level of resources (Maritan 2001, Chao and Kavadias 2010, Kava-
dias and Kovach 2010). As such, top-down processes aim to establish the efficient use
of resources by maintaining control. In contrast, bottom-up processes aim to leverage
the effective use of resources, by empowering managers to tailor resource allocation
based on their expert knowledge of the challenges associated with the execution of the
initiative. Since both types of processes are encountered in practice, a natural ques-
tion arises: when is it best to employ a top-down process as opposed to a bottom-up
one? These observations fuel a more general question regarding the existence of pro-
cesses that combine the best elements of both approaches. Could such an “optimal”
process be operationalized?
Scholars have long studied the efficient implementation of top-down resource al-
location (Harris et al. 1982). More recently the Operations Management literature
has explored decision making processes that account for the hierarchical nature of
decision making within organizations (Siemsen 2008, Chao et al. 2009, Loch and
Sting 2010, Mihm 2010, Mihm et al. 2010). These studies have primarily emerged
within the new product development (NPD) domain due to the obvious fit; NPD is
highly specialized (Zingales and Rajan, 2001), with activities that require decentral-
ized expertise, and it is central to the growth and livelihood of the firm. As such it
requires substantial resources. However, most of these studies have focused on the
private effort undertaken by NPD specialists and have not accounted for the existence
of bottom-up resource decisions, i.e. budgets that are shaped by middle management.
In this study we seek to understand the drivers of profitable resource allocation.
We account for both the hierarchical nature of the organization, and the asymme-
tries that exist between stakeholders, i.e. the middle management (PM) and senior
management (e.g. a Vice President who acts as a proxy for the executive level of deci-
sion making within the firm). We capture the hierarchical nature of decision making
through the use of a principal-agent model, where the PM (agent) must oversee the
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detailed execution of the initiative (whether or not he1 decides the level of resources
he still must allocate them optimally), and the VP (principal) dictates the initiative
based on strategic fit. We distinguish between the resource allocation processes based
on which stakeholder (the PM or VP) chooses the level of resources (budget) to allo-
cate to the initiative. Our model captures an important asymmetry between the VP
and the PM, regarding their respective knowledge of the difficulty associated with
the execution of the initiative. We allow the PM to fully understand the difficulty of
the initiative (as expressed by the relationship between resources allocated and the
likelihood that the initiative will succeed); in contrast, the VP only knows that the
initiative may be one with difficult task execution or one with simpler task execution.
In order to capture tensions between stakeholders that are driven by the organization
itself, we choose not to focus on the personal (private) effort of the project manager
(PM) as the source of any misalignment between the objectives of the VP and the
PM. Instead, we posit that any disutility for the PM results from the risk of failing,
and the ex-post penalties that he might incur. Thus, we consider the straightforward
setting where the PM would rather be rewarded than penalized, and he chooses ac-
tions according to the utility he receives from each occurrence (success or failure).
This interpretation of the organizational context makes the firm’s organizational cul-
ture an important element of our model (Kreps 1990, Hermalin 2008, Schein 2010).
The culture determines the organizational norms which dictate the consequences a
PM can expect following a failed outcome (i.e. the organizational penalty2).
Our findings show that, contingent on the information asymmetry between the
stakeholders and the difficulty of the initiative, a top-down process may prove more
1We adopt the convention that the agent is referred to as “he” while we refer to the Vice President
(VP) as “she”.
2Such penalties may be as subtle as the manager receiving all the “unwanted” projects, or as
explicit as being fired. They reflect the organization’s set of rules and routines, that define “how
things get done,” and they represent a key dimension of the organizational culture: the “tolerance
for failure” (Manso 2010)
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beneficial than a bottom-up one, and vice versa. Thus, we offer normative support
regarding the need for both bottom up and top-down processes to co-exist within
organizations, as advocated early on by Burgelman’s (1983) seminal work3. We ana-
lytically characterize when each respective process is more beneficial: initiatives with
high expected difficulty, benefit from a bottom-up process; however, when the ex-
pected difficulty is low, a top-down process is better. We then show that there does
exist a resource allocation process that employs budgets and incentives tailored to
the execution difficulty of the initiative, which outperforms both, i.e. the top-down
and bottom-up approaches. Yet, the implementation of such a process for all types
of initiatives is potentially involved (if not prohibitive) for most organizations to im-
plement4. Fortunately, there is a silver-lining: solely implementing budgets tailored
to the difficulty of the initiative, an industry practice known as strategic buckets, can
still offer benefits over both the top-down and bottom-up processes. In other words,
strategic buckets enable the firm to expand the set of initiatives it can profitably fund.
Our findings add an operational perspective to two important discussions: first, we
offer insights on how the decision structure defined by the respective RAP impacts
which initiatives a firm funds (Bower and Gilbert 2005); second, we offer an alter-
native explanation for the use of strategic buckets in organizations as a means of
effective resource allocation (Chao and Kavadias 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We review the relevant literature
in §3.2 and introduce our model setup in §3.3. Following our model setup we provide
the analysis of our model in §3.4. In our model analysis, we first characterize the first-
best solution in §3.4.1, then follow this with a characterization of the top-down and
3Burgelman (1983) advocates that project definition occurs both in a top-down and bottom-up
manner, whereas we specifically study the process by which the resource level (i.e. budget) is decided
upon. Then in a similar fashion, we note that bottom-up and top-down processes for resource level
decisions need to coexist within a single organization.
4Mihm 2010 offers a rich discussion regarding why such tailored non-linear incentive contracts
are hard to implement.
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bottom-up resource allocation processes in §3.4.2 and 3.4.3, respectively. Then, we
provide an exposition of a resource allocation process that captures elements of both
the bottom-up and top-down processes in §3.4.4. Lastly, we close with a discussion
and conclusions in §3.5.
3.2 Related Literature
A substantial body of research across various management disciplines, has addressed
various challenges surrounding resource allocation decisions. Of these studies, the
literature that is most relevant to our work comes from research in Operations Man-
agement (OM), Strategic Management and Corporate Finance.
Several scholars have looked at the resource allocation problem in an effort to
answer the following question: should a firm fund (or continue funding) a specific
initiative (e.g. Roberts and Weitzman, 1981, Teisberg 1993,1994, Huchzermeier and
Loch 2001, Santiago and Vakili 2005)? This stream of research builds upon a long
tradition in the field of Operations Research and considers a decision process where
the decision maker and the executor of the project tasks are one and the same. We
relate to the overarching objective of these papers, as we look at the decision process
associated with resource allocation and the choice to fund a project. However, we take
a different perspective as we account for the realities of the NPD process: hierarchical
decision making, and the distributed nature of knowledge which gives rise to agency
and incentive challenges. Recently, scholars in NPD have begun to account for the
hierarchical nature of decision making (Siemsen 2008, Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Chao
et al. 2009, Mihm et al. 2010, Mihm 2010, Erat and Krishnan 2010). Two of these
studies, lie closer to our work: Chao et al. (2009) and Siemsen (2008). Specifically,
Chao et al. (2009), being the closest, study a hierarchical setting where a senior
manager (principal) chooses between “empowering” a business unit manager (agent)
to adapt his innovation budget to the division sales, or to “control” the agent through
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issuing him a fixed innovation budget . Given the funding policy, the agent decides to
optimally allocate resources to exploration (long term) or exploitation (short term)
initiatives. Chao et al. (2009) compare different funding policies, but they do not
characterize the optimal funding decisions for the principal in each of these settings.
We extend their setting to characterize and compare the optimal funding decision
across different resource allocation processes. Although Chao et al. (2009) assume
that the exact resource allocation is not observable by the principal, we posit that
resource budgets are in fact observable by senior management and that there is a more
suitable source of asymmetry between the stakeholders that arises from knowledge
specialization as opposed to accounting “noise”. Siemsen (2008) explores another
aspect of the hierarchical nature of the firm: the effect of career concerns on the task
difficulty choice of the employee (agent). Siemsen focuses solely on the effects of career
concerns, independent of any other incentive mechanism5, and given that the agent’s
utility is reputation related. We build on his observation that specialists have more
refined knowledge of the difficulty associated with project tasks, and we incorporate
this insight to solve for senior management’s (the principal’s) optimal choice regarding
the resource allocation process and actual resource allocation in order to maximizes
firm profits.
Our research question also echoes prior attempts to determine the optimal resource
allocation from the field of “capital budgeting” (Harris et al. 1982, Antle and Eppen
1985, Baiman and Rajan 1995), which has flourished in the Accounting and Corporate
Finance disciplines. We share a common conceptualization of the resource allocation
problem. We agree with the assumptions made in this stream of literature: decisions
are decentralized and hierarchical; there exists asymmetry of information between the
stakeholders; and that the compensation and incentive schemes rely on incomplete
5In a related follow up Katok and Siemsen (2009) elaborate on the principal’s use of the value of
the promotion in order to influence the agent’s choice.
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contracts. However, the context of NPD initiatives presents distinct challenges that
are not of primary concern to this stream of literature: (i) the assumed returns on
investment exhibit strong non-linearities (Loch and Kavadias 2002), different from the
additive or linear profit functions predominantly used in capital budgeting; (ii) these
non-linearities stem from strong complementarities between the resources allocated
and the difficulty of tasks being executed, i.e. a disproportionate increase in the
resources allocated is required for more difficult projects; (iii) the specialization know-
how held by the project team is not imitable by the senior management of the firm
and therefore substitution of effort across stakeholders may not be possible; finally
(iv) the disutility of the agent may be a result of organizational norms (i.e. penalties
resulting from a failed initiative) and not solely a result of effort put towards a project.
Our model formulation specifically accounts for these distinctions and operationalizes
the resource allocation process in an NPD setting.
Finally, we owe special credit to the seminal work of Bower (1970) and Burgelman
(1983) in the Strategic Management discipline, as they offer substantial field evi-
dence about the structure of the resource allocation processes found in organizations.
Their insights have given way to a debate about the benefits arising from bottom-
up versus top-down resource allocation processes, and they have informed many of
the constructs of our model (for a thorough review see Bower and Gilbert 2005).
However, the primary research method applied in these studies has been descriptive
field research (Bower and Doz 1979, Burgelman 1983, Maritan 2001). We borrow
their grounded theory to develop a normative model that seeks to explain their find-
ings. In that vein, our work operationalizes the choice of resource allocation processes
within a hierarchical organization and lends support to the observations that NPD
processes require a hierarchical planning perspective (Anderson and Joglekar 2005).
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3.3 Model Setup
In this section, we introduce the formal structure of our model. Consider a typical or-
ganizational hierarchy: senior management (the VP, i.e. principal) oversees a project
manager (i.e. agent), who is responsible for the detailed execution of NPD initiatives.
The project manager represents all of the interests and task specific knowledge of
the entire project team; the VP acts as a proxy for the firm’s interests, and she is
responsible for the implementation of a dimension of corporate strategy, through an
innovative initiative. The VP, assigns the initiative based on a simple rule: does she
expect the initiative to add value6 to the firm, i.e. is E[Π] ≥ Π̂? Where Π̂ is the
minimum value the firm must gain from an initiative in order for it to be consid-
ered worthwhile. Prior research (Bower 1970, Burgelman 1983, Coen and Maritan
2010) has identified a critical factor that influences the decision to fund an initiative
or not: the structural context in which the initiative is carried out (i.e. the “or-
ganizational design, and compensation plans that top executives can manipulate to
influence indirectly what type of strategic initiatives are defined and selected”– Bower
1970) . Then, given the specific initiative and its structural context, researchers have
advocated that successful execution and profitability depend on elements of the re-
source allocation process, i.e. who decides what (Bower and Gilbert 2005). In the
following three sub-sections we detail these three constructs: the properties of the
initiative, the structural context, and the structure of the resource allocation process,
respectively. Our objective is to employ these constructs and characterize the value
maximizing process choice given an initiative, for a particular firm. Our model setup
offers some novel conceptual contributions to the normative organizational design
literature, which we highlight in §3.3.5.
6Value can be thought of as monetary cash flow, monetary equivalents, e.g. other outcomes such
as knowledge, etc.
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3.3.1 The NPD initiative.
The initiative is defined by the value it yields, should it realize a successful outcome,
and its likelihood of success. Without any loss of generality, we assume that the
potential value V is fixed, and known by all of the stakeholders, i.e. the VP and the
PM. The probability of success depends on two key factors: the difficulty of the tasks
required to execute the initiative, and the resources allocated to the initiative.
The difficulty of the strategic initiative depends on how arduous the respective
tasks are for the project team. In order to fully understand the task details, spe-
cialized knowledge is required, which resides with the project team (i.e. project
manager). Such knowledge is neither easily communicated (i.e. “transferred”), nor
readily understood, by stakeholders who are not intimately involved with the execu-
tion of the specific tasks. Thus, the VP cannot understand the intricate details of
the initiative. Let θi, i ∈ {d, e} represent the difficulty of the initiative specific tasks,
where θi ∈ [0, 1]. An initiative with θ = 0 represents an impossible task, and θ = 1
represents tasks that have the highest chance of success for a given resource level
allocated to them. A-priori the difficulty is unknown to both stakeholders, however
prior to the execution of the initiative, the project manager learns θ (while the VP
does not). As such, θ is own private knowledge held by the project manager. The
initiative may realize a difficult set of tasks for the project team (θ = θd), or an easier
– more standard – set of tasks θ = θe, which we normalize to be θe = 1. We refer to
this type of initiative as one that is standard for the organization.
If R represents the decision regarding the level of resources allocated to the ini-
tiative, then the likelihood that the firm realizes the project value V , is defined as
p[θ, R] = θP [R]. We assume p[θ, R] to be quasi-concave and super-modular in θ
and R. More specifically: ∂p/∂R > 0, ∂p/∂θ > 0, ∂2p/∂R2 < 0, ∂2p/∂θ2 ≤ 0,
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∂2p/(∂R∂θ) > 0, and lim
R→∞
p[θd, R] < lim
R→∞
p[θe, R], where lim
R→∞
p[1, R] = 1. Our struc-
tural assumptions regarding p[θ, R] represent a set of intuitive properties: the likeli-
hood of success is increasing in both the resources allocated to the initiative, and the
ease with which tasks can be accomplished for each given resource level; there may be
diminishing returns to the likelihood of success resulting from the resources allocated
to the initiative , as well as the ease to which the tasks can be accomplished; finally
the resources allocated, and the ease by which the tasks are executed, are comple-
mentary inputs to the likelihood of success. Indeed, more difficult initiatives require
a disproportionately higher level of resources to achieve a given likelihood of success.
Furthermore the most difficult initiatives may never have the same likelihood of suc-
cess as a more standard one, regardless of the level of resources allocated to it. Since
the likelihood is endogenously determined by the allocated resources, the structural
context, within which resource decisions are made, is essential to understand.
3.3.2 Structural context.
There are two key elements that comprise the structural context in our model: first,
the degree of information asymmetry that exists between the VP and the project
manager (the stakeholders); second, the organizational norms that govern the implicit
rules and expectations regarding “how things are done”, namely the organizational
penalties imposed upon managers who fail to complete the strategic objectives7.
We begin with a closer look at the information asymmetry. The project man-
ager holds private knowledge regarding the actual difficulty of the required project
tasks. As such, he knows θ, yet the VP only knows that θ may be difficult (θd) with
7Note that the compensation and incentives might be considered part of the structural context,
yet they could be adjusted within the context of a resource allocation process. Thus, we choose
to discuss them together with the decisions regarding the resource allocation process in §3.3.3. In
contrast, we posit that it is rarely the case that organizational norms can be altered within the scope
of a single initiative.
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probability q and easy (θe = 1) with probability (1 − q). This intentional misalign-
ment regarding the knowledge of task execution effectively captures an important
reality of the NPD context. Specialists hold competencies that are hard to imitate,
let alone replicate. This reality has been argued to lead to hierarchies in the first
place (Zingales and Rajan 2001).
Organizational rules implicitly govern how things get done. Such (usually non-
codified) rules comprise an organization’s corporate culture (Kreps 1990, Hermalin
2008, Chao et al. 2009, Schein 2010). In our context we focus on a particularly
important“rule”, namely what happens to the project manager if an initiative fails?
There is ample evidence that organizations differ, in the consequences they impose, re-
garding such outcomes (e.g. a diminished intra-organizational status, reflected in the
career paths or development programs the manager is considered for). This dimen-
sion of a firm’s “tolerance for failure”that we consider has recently drawn attention
as an important determinant of task execution (Manso 2010). Drawing upon sev-
eral interviews with senior NPD managers, we have found that such consequences
are strongly associated with the resources allocated to the initiative (R). Even in
a harsh corporate environment, an initiative that fails, yet consumes negligible re-
sources, would not warrant detrimental consequences for the PM’s career. However,
for an initiative that consumes copious amounts of organizational resources, and fails,
we would expect the consequences to proportionally be much greater. We capture
the resource dependence of this organizational effect through a linear parametriza-
tion of the penalty: kpR; kp is exogenously fixed for a specific organization, and as a
dimension of the corporate culture, it reflects implicit policies, or accepted routines
that are hard to change, at least within the context of a single initiative. In §3.3.4, we
discuss how this organizational penalty factors into the overall utility of the project
manager.
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3.3.3 The resource allocation process (RAP)
Given the definition of the initiative itself (3.3.1), and the structural context (3.3.2),
the VP considers the appropriate resource allocation process to use in order to max-
imize the organization’s profits. The choice of the “right” process takes the previous
constructs into account in order to determine which stakeholder should be granted
decision rights to determine the resource level, and how the VP should influence this
decision, should she choose to delegate decision rights (Bower and Gilbert 2005)?
The VP assigns the strategic initiative when she expects the firm to receive value
at least equal to Π̂. The expected value to the VP is E[Π] = p[θ, R]V − R −W , or
the expected revenue of the project (p[θ, R]V ), net of expenses associated with the
allocation of resources (R), and wages (W ) required to execute it. Yet, as we have
described in 3.3.1, the likelihood of success is not an exogenously specified quantity,
but a function of the resources allocated and the difficulty of the execution tasks. In
addition, the VP does not know the latter with certainty. Under such circumstances,
the VP can choose to enlist the detailed knowledge (project difficulty) of the PM,
and delegate the resource allocation decisions to him, which we define as a bottom-
up resource allocation process; or she can dictate the exact resource budget, which
we define as a top-down resource allocation process. Changes in how resources are
allocated might also warrant changes to the compensation structure, W , as well. Let
W [w, ks] = w + ks(V − R), represent a generic form of compensation offered to the
PM; it is a combination of a fixed wage w portion and an output contingent profit-
share mechanism, ks(V − R). Our analysis determines which parts of such generic
compensation are rendered inactive, i.e. w = 0 or ks = 0, under different choices
of RAP. Regardless of whether the VP chooses a top-down or a bottom-up resource
allocation process, she must set compensation so that the project manager does not
ex-ante expect to suffer a loss from undertaking the initiative. In other words, the
PM expects to at least earn a level of utility equal to his opportunity cost (U); which,
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Sequence of events
VP chooses strategic 
initiative to be added 
to the firm portfolio 
based on: E[P] > .
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• Dictate budget 
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Figure 6: The sequence of events and related decisions.
without loss of generality, we normalize to zero (Baiman and Rajan 1995)8.
The following two important observations drawn from field studies support our
assumptions regarding the resource allocation process: i) the PM is always given
formal authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997) to recommend the initiative not be funded
(i.e. alternatively, they are allowed to “opt-out”) – the expectation is that they do so
when their outside option (U) is not met on expectation (Baiman and Rajan 1995)9;
ii) the VP can not determine (or verify) the true underlying task difficulty (i.e. θ
is not directly contractible) regardless of the outcome (success or failure), i.e. the
contract is incomplete.
8The opportunity cost of the PM is common knowledge. The interpretation is intuitive: embedded
in the opportunity cost is the benefit the PM can receive, net of switching costs, if they were to
choose alternate employment. This simply captures the intuitive realization that, if you put a PM on
a project where their exposure to failure is simply too high (and the resulting penalties too harsh),
they would rather seek out alternative opportunities than risk having their career prospects severely
impacted.
9Note, we claim that the VP expects the PM to “opt-out” if their outside option is not met. To
see this imagine that the VP only wanted to pursue simpler initiatives. Since she could not a-priori
know what the difficulty is, nor could she ex-post confirm it, the only way she could achieve this
would be to design compensation such that the PM opts-out of initiatives when he realizes difficult
execution tasks. If the PM were not allowed to opt-out, then the VP could not achieve this.
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We present the sequence of decisions, and the timing of information in Figure 6.
The sequence reflects our own anecdotal evidence, but also rests upon the extensive
volume of field studies conducted by researchers of Strategic Management (Bower and
Gilbert 2005).
3.3.4 The feasible set of initiatives and stakeholder utilities
Now that we have discussed the main conceptual elements of our model, we for-
mally define the expected profit of the VP, the expected utility of the PM, and each
stakeholder’s respective maximization objective.
Definition 3. The expected profit of the VP and utility of the project
manager.
The VP’s problem is as follows:
When resources are dictated:
max
R,W
E[Π] = Eθ[θP [R]V −R−W ]
s.t. E[U |θ] = W − (1− θP [R])kpR ≥ U
E[Π] ≥ Π̂
When the PM is fully empowered:
max
W
E[Π] = Eθ[θP [Rθ]V −Rθ −W [Rθ]]
s.t. E[U |θ] = W [Rθ]− (1− θP [Rθ])kpRθ ≥ U
E[Π] ≥ Π̂
Rθ = arg max
Rθ
W [Rθ]− kp(1− θP [Rθ])Rθ
Having stated each stakeholder’s utility and objective function, we explain how
the structural context and the resource allocation process impact the initiatives that
the firm decides to fund, i.e. those strategic initiatives where E[Π] ≥ Π̂. We define
the feasible set of initiatives as those initiatives for which E[Π] ≥ Π̂, for a given
resource allocation process, and structural context; thus, the feasible set contains
the initiatives the VP is willing to fund. Ceteris paribus, a smaller feasible set of
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initiatives can be interpreted as a smaller set of opportunities within which the firm
can seek profit. This conceptualization of the feasible set of initiatives, given the
organizational context, is an analog to Markowitz’s (1952, p. 85) “attainable set” of
investments given a specific individual investor. Markowitz explains that there is no
single attainable set of investments for all investors, but that the set of attainable
investments depends on the individual’s risk preferences. Our analysis considers how
a firm’s organizational context and its resource allocation process impact its set of
feasible initiatives.
3.3.5 Summary of conceptual contributions
Prior to our analysis, we provide a brief discussion of the conceptual contributions
and key distinctions of our model. In summary, our model formulation captures the
following salient features of the NPD context:
• The knowledge that is required to make critical funding decisions is dispersed
among various stakeholders resulting in distinct information asymmetries within
the organizational hierarchy. In that respect, it is impossible to ex-post identify
the specific “cause” of the success or failure of an initiative (i.e. insufficient
resources or a random outcome).
• The utility functions of the stakeholders are risk neutral. Our assumption aims
to avoid any a priori risk bias. We do this to isolate potential organizational
effects, as opposed to relying upon explanations based on individual behavioral
traits, a usual justification for an organization’s avoidance of risky initiatives
(Hauser 1998).
• Most traditional agency models assume managerial risk aversion, and a disu-
tility from personal effort to justify both an organization’s tendency to forego
difficult initiatives and their use of output contingent compensation. Instead,
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we show that the nonlinear returns from a NPD initiative and the existence of
organizational penalties represent an alternative rationale.
• The only private component in the project manager’s objective is his knowledge
of the true difficulty the initiative represents θ. Given such a formulation, we
avoid any a-priori misalignment between the payoffs to the stakeholders, another
highly cited reason for many organizations’ failure to pursue risky initiatives
(Siemsen 2008, Manso 2010, Mihm 2010). In our model, the “alignment”10
between the VP and the PM’s objective lies within the VP’s discretion.
• Lastly, we recognize the complementarity between project type (i.e. task diffi-
culty) and the resources allocated. Such complementarities stem from the fact
that NPD initiatives exhibit complex interactions, such that marginally increas-
ing difficulty along any single dimension could imply a disproportionate increase
in the resources required to achieve the same likelihood of success.
3.4 Analytic results
In this section we present the results of our model analysis. Recall that, we aim to
answer the following question: When is it better to have a process that delegates the
resource allocation decision? We start with the first-best outcome, i.e. all stakeholders
know the true difficulty of the initiative. The first-best outcome allows us to establish
a baseline result, and to develop key metrics and intuition. We then move to the more
realistic setting where information asymmetries exist regarding the initiative difficulty.
Within such a setting, we first analyze a top-down resource allocation process, and
then we contrast this analysis with the results from the bottom-up process where the
PM is fully empowered. Following our comparison, we seek to identify a RAP that
10We define alignment strictly in terms of the objectives of each stakeholder (in line with prior
literature, see Van Den Steen 2007). The stakeholders are aligned when their optimal actions yield
the same solutions.
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mitigates the challenges associated with either the top-down or bottom-up process.
We find that if we relax the assumption that requires the organization to apply a
uniform compensation scheme (i.e. w and/or ks are independent of θ), and instead
allow the firm to offer the PM a choice between pre-defined resource levels, where
each resource level is coupled with a different compensation scheme (i.e. an “incentive
feasible menu of contracts”), then we can achieve a RAP that outperforms both the
top-down and bottom-up processes for all levels of expected difficulty. We discuss
the limitations of such a process in practice, as identified by the prior literature,
and we point out that a simplified version of such a RAP can (weakly) supersede
the traditional top-down and bottom-up processes. Eventually, we point out that
this simplified version resembles and justifies the widely used practice of resource
allocation via “strategic-buckets”.
3.4.1 Baseline: First-best solution
We begin our model analysis with a look at the first-best setting, where no information
asymmetries exist. The difficulty of the initiative is known to all stakeholders. In
this setting, for an initiative of known type θ, the optimal choice for the VP is to
determine resource levels and ensure implementation through the use of a fixed wage
compensation plan. We formally state these results below and defer the proofs to the
appendix, for clarity of exposition.
Proposition 6. First best resource allocation and the feasible set.
(a) The optimal resource level R
fb
solves: ∂P [·]/ ∂R = (1+kp(1−θP [R]))/(V +kpR)
and it is increasing in the ease of the project tasks θ, i.e. ∂R
fb
[·]/∂θ > 0
(b) The feasible set of initiatives is defined by:
F fb .=
{






and F fb increases as θ increases.
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The first-best resource level has an economic interpretation. For each additional
unit of resources the VP allocates, the probability of success p increases, (V − R)
decreases, and the managers face a larger penalty kpR should the project fail. The
optimal resource allocation equates marginal expected value from each additional unit
of resource, to the marginal cost of compensation the VP must bear to cover the PM’s
the potential organizational penalty. Beyond this resource level, any marginal value
gained from an additional resource (V ∂P [·]/∂R − 1) is outweighed by the marginal
wages (kp(1 − P [·] − R∂P [·]/∂R)) required to offset the potential penalty faced by
the managers.
As θ decreases (i.e. more difficult tasks), the optimal level of resources decreases.
The result stems from the assumed complementarity between the task difficulty and
the resources allocated. Finally, we outline the baseline feasible set of initiatives.
3.4.2 A resource allocation process that maintains control
In a top-down resource allocation process, the VP dictates the level of resources,
and the compensation plan. In such a setting, the VP needs to ensure that the
compensation offered to the project manager provides him with an expected utility
at least equal to his reservation utility, regardless of the realization of the initiative’s
difficulty. The following proposition outlines the implications of implementing a top-
down resource allocation process.
Proposition 7. A top-down resource allocation process and its feasi-
ble set. The following statements hold when the VP chooses a top-down resource
allocation process:
(a) The VP offers compensation in the form of a fixed wage.
k∗s = 0 and w
∗ = kpR
∗
(1− θdP [R∗ ]), where R∗ is the optimal level of resources.








and it is strictly less than the first-best, i.e. R
∗
[E[θ]] < Rfb [E[θ]]
(c) F td .=
{
E[θ] : Eθ[Π] ≥ Π̂
}
, F td ≤ F fb, and F td gets smaller as kp increases.
When the resource levels are dictated to the project manager, it is suboptimal to
use compensation schemes that are contingent on the outcome. If the VP were to use
output contingent compensation with an incentive parameter ks, then in the event the
PM realizes θe, i.e. a standard project, he is disproportionately (over) compensated
11,
and increases the firm’s loss. This loss is a result of the complementarity between θ
and R. It follows that it is better for the firmto avoid such a loss by offering a fixed
wage.
Next, we compare the VP’s resource allocation decision when she does not know
the actual difficulty, and only knows E[θ] = qθd + (1 − q)θe (i.e. under asymmetric
information), with the decision she would make if she knew (with certainty) that
θ = qθd + (1 − q)θe (i.e. the first-best decision for θ). This comparison reveals that
as long as some level of asymmetry exists (q 6= {0, 1}), the resources assigned under
asymmetric information are always less than the first-best level. This results from
the VP’s need to offset a more costly expected penalty, i.e. (1− θdP [R])kpR > (1−
E[θ]P [R])kpR in order to ensure that the initiative is executed. The difference between
the optimal resource allocation under a top-down RAP and that of the first-best
setting, is moderated by both the organizational penalty kp and the expected difficulty
E[θ]. Again, this is a direct result of the VP’s inability to know the PM’s expected
penalty for a given resource level, and her need to tailor the resource allocation to
the worst case scenario, θd. In a harsher organization, the VP must account for a
11We elaborate on the use of the term “disproportionately”: it is true that regardless of the
compensation scheme, a PM who realizes θe will always be overcompensated (in the sense that they
expect to earn U > U); when an output contingent compensation scheme is used, the surplus the
PM expects to earn is even greater compared to the surplus expected with a fixed wage.
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higher kp which results in a greater loss due to the firm leaving additional surplus
for the PM who realizes θe. Overall, for initiatives that encompass more difficulty
than is usually undertaken (unfamiliar task domains), the VP ends up significantly
under-investing resources when employing a top-down RAP.
A critical implication of the information asymmetry is whether the VP deems it
worthy to fund the initiative. Our analysis highlights the fact that projects live and
die by how well understood they are by the stakeholders of the firm (Bower 1970).
Whereas in the first-best θ was known and we defined F fb in terms of θ, for the
top-down RAP we define the feasible set of initiatives F td in terms of the expected
difficulty E[θ], and compare it to F fb . The feasible set of initiatives shrinks when
the stakeholders are more asymmetrically informed for a given set of task difficulties.
Although our result is intuitive, it is valuable to understand both how and why it





) in order to ensure that even when the PM realizes θd, he
still is sufficiently compensated (i.e. his reservation utility is met). The necessity to
compensate the project manager for a θd realization impacts the VP in two ways:
not only does a lower θd exaggerate the under-investment, but it also drives the
VP to compensate the PM beyond what he might require when undertaking a θe
set of tasks. The former implies that the overall profits generated will be less on
expectation, while the latter allows the PM to appropriate a greater portion of the
profits that are generated. Ultimately, initiatives that were deemed worthy of funding
under a first-best scenario, no longer are. This effect gets exacerbated in the context
of an organization with a low tolerance for failure (high kp). Organizations that
impose harsh penalties for failed initiatives, significantly reduce their feasible set of
initiatives. Less projects meet the Π̂ criteria required for the firm to fund them.
When the result is thought of in terms of a firm’s overall ability to innovate, any
reduction to the feasible set can have a significant impact on the firm (Kornish and
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Ulrich 2010). To see this, think of the feasible set as an opportunity set. Limiting the
set of feasible initiatives amounts to limiting the opportunities for the organization;
a result most firms would rather avoid.
3.4.3 A resource allocation process that empowers the project manager
We now examine the situation where the VP delegates the decision rights (Aghion
and Tirole 1997) regarding the resource levels and delegates such a decision to the
project manager (i.e. a bottom-up resource allocation process). The extant Strategic
Management literature advocates the value of such delegation (Bower and Gilbert
2005). In such a setting, the only decision made by the VP is to set the compensation
such that the project manager executes the initiative (i.e. does not exercise his
authority to opt-out of particular initiatives) regardless of θ.
Proposition 8. The full-empowerment resource allocation process. The
following statements hold when the VP chooses a full-empowerment resource allocation
process:
(a) The VP offers compensation that is contingent on outcome:
w∗ = 0 and k∗s =
kpR∗[θd](1−θdP [R∗[θd]])
(V−R∗[θd])θdP [R∗[θd]]















∗[θe]](V P [R∗[θd]]θd−R∗[θd])−P [R∗[θd]]θd(V−R∗[θd])
R∗[θd](V (1−P [R∗[θd]]θd)−R∗[θe])+V P [R∗[θd]]θdR∗[θe]









, the resource level chosen by the project manager
is equal to the first-best resource level.
(d) The set of feasible initiatives is: F fe =
{
E[θ] : Eθ[Π] ≥ Π̂
}
. F fe < F fb, and gets
smaller as kp increases.
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In contrast to the top-down resource allocation process, under full-empowerment,
the VP is strictly better off by implementing an output-contingent compensation
scheme12. Since, the only cost faced by the PM is the potential organizational penalty
kpR, the VP must offer output-contingent compensation to induce the project man-
ager to allocate any resources at all. If a fixed wage were offered to the project
manager, then regardless of θ, he would be better off allocating the minimum level
of resources (ε → 0). In other words, a fixed wage yields the PM w with certainty
when the minimum level of resources are allocated, whereas if the PM allocates sig-
nificant levels of resources (R > ε), at best he can earn w, but he faces w− kpR with
some positive probability. Thus, if the PM is given full-empowerment after receiv-
ing a fixed wage, he has minimal incentive to allocate resources. Instead, with an
output-contingent compensation, the project manager faces the following trade-off:
he increases the resources allocated in order to increase likelihood of success P [R],
and decrease the likelihood of a penalty; yet, he needs to limit the resources allocated
in order to preserve the profit, V −R and limit the penalty kpR should the initiative
fail. To accomplish the optimal balance, the project manager accounts for his private
information and decides on the resources allocated accordingly. Then, the VP sets
the compensation such that the PM executes the initiative (with a non-zero resource
allocation), regardless of the difficulty. This translates into an incentive parameter
designed for θd.
Once the compensation is set, the project manager’s decision is solely affected by
the relationship between the share of profits (ks) and the harshness of the penalty
(kp). Note that, neither the PM’s resource level choice, nor the VP’s incentive choice
is affected by the likelihood of the different difficulty realizations (i.e. q); only the
expected profits are affected. The manager is unaffected by q, as he makes his decision
12The VP designs compensation to ensure that the reservation utility is met for all initiatives she
funds. Recall, the PM is risk neutral and his reservation utility is equal to zero.
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under full knowledge of the difficulty. The VP need not account for q in her choice of
incentive since she knows that the project manager is unaffected by it, and the fact
that she designs the incentives solely with the most difficult realization in mind, θd,
not the likelihood that such a difficulty realizes.
Interestingly, it is possible to achieve the first-best level resource allocation when
the VP delegates the resource allocation decision. Furthermore, the firm can attain
a resource allocation of R
fb
[θ] under full-empowerment for both θd and θe, when the
firm’s expected difficulty meets the condition outlined in Proposition 8 (c). Why does
this happen for both difficulty realizations? Recall that under full-empowerment the
PM sets the resource levels with full knowledge of the task difficulty θ for a given
incentive ks. The incentive parameter is set based on θd, and it is independent of the
resources allocated under a θe realization. Said differently, regardless of the realization
of θ, the PM receives the same share of profits should the initiative succeed. Similarly,
the magnitude of kp independent of the difficulty realization. Knowing that the PM’s
resource allocation decision is driven by ks and kp, and that both are independent
of θ, we can define a relationship between ks and kp such that the objectives of the
firm and those of the PM are aligned. Then, R
fb
can be achieved regardless of θ,
by empowering the PM. Below, we outline the implications for the choice of RAP
resulting from this ability to achieve such alignment between the VP and the PM.
Proposition 9. When full-empowerment dominates a top-down process.
For an organization with kp < k̄p:
(a) A top-down resource allocation process yields a higher profit for initiatives with
low expected difficulty (i.e. as E[θ]→ 1).
(b) A full-empowerment resource allocation process yields higher profit than a top-
down resource allocation process for initiatives in the interval [θ`, θ̄].
13, where
13Let the superscripts td and fe denote top-down and full-empowerment respectively. Then for
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Less Difficult More difficult
Expected Difficulty 
(E[θ])











< θ̄ and q > q̂
(c) A top-down process always dominates a full-empowerment resource process for
sufficiently high Π̂ (and the feasible set is always smaller with a full-empowerment
resource process).
Proposition 9 elaborates on the inherent trade-offs between the type of resource
allocation process used, and the profitability objectives of the firm. No resource
allocation process strictly dominates in all possible situations. The finding lends




[θ] as shown in the proof of Theorem
9 if θ̂ : Π
fe
[θ̂] = 0, the lower threshold on the interval of Theorem 9 (b) is θ` = max{θ̂, θ}.
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normative support to Burgelman’s (1983) claim that organizations need to employ
multiple processes for innovation, an observation also presented recently by Chao and
Kavadias (2009). Thus, it is important to understand when each resource allocation
process is most appropriate. Intuitively, when the initiative is fairly standard (i.e.
E[θ] → θe = 1), the firm expects to earn greater profits by dictating the resource
level. This is a clear situation where the VP benefits from efficiency and control. In
such cases, the VP knows the difficulty of the undertaking with relative accuracy,
and thus the value of the private knowledge of the project manager is diminished.
However, as E[θ] decreases (either because the asymmetry between the stakeholders
increases, or the initiative has a lower θd), the value of the project manager’s private
knowledge increases. In Proposition 8 we argued that the incentives offered to the
project manager can induce him to make the first-best resource allocation. Given
this observation, the only loss to the VP results from the need to use an outcome
contingent incentive ks, which yields less profit as compared to the use of a fixed-wage.
Such a loss, increases in the magnitude of kp (Proposition 7) such that for low enough
kp the compensation loss is dominated by the gain in expected overall profit due to
the first-best resource allocation. In the end, the loss from the outcome contingent
compensation is mitigated when kp is relatively low (i.e for organizations that are
not severely harsh) and the context is one of high asymmetry and difficulty, where
the gains are larger from obtaining the first best resource allocation. In other words,
under such settings the organization can successfully fund and execute high difficulty
initiatives (such as developing a radically new technology or entering an entirely new
market).
Finally, we turn to the VP’s criteria for funding initiatives. As the VP’s threshold
(Π̂) becomes higher (e.g. resulting from high value alternatives considered for the
firm’s portfolio), the VP does two things: restrict the overall feasible set of initiatives
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(as shown in Proposition 6), and renders a full-empowerment process inferior to a top-
down process for all feasible initiatives. Taken together these results have powerful
managerial implications as they highlight the need for multiple processes within a
single firm. A firm that only employs a single RAP does itself an injustice: solely
implementing a top-down process means a reduction in the feasible set, i.e. the firm
foregoes initiatives that would otherwise be profitable under a fully empowered RAP
(i.e. initiatives where E[Πfe] ≥ Π̂ but E[Πtd] < Π̂); yet, solely implementing a fully
empowered RAP means foregoing profits for those initiatives that are more standard.
3.4.4 A resource allocation process that allows “empowerment” and “con-
trol”?
Thus far we have presented two resource allocation processes that highlight the trade-
off between, the control and efficiency gained by a central choice of the resource
budgets along with the compensation and the effective use of knowledge, that comes
from empowering the project manager to tailor resource levels to the difficulty of the
initiative. In that light, the lack of any single process to outperform the other in all
settings opens up a question of whether it is possible for the VP to maintain some
control, and the associated efficiency benefits, while empowering the PM to have some
influence on what the resource levels should be, and thus reap benefits from the PM’s
expertise.
In this section we analyze whether the firm can accomplish such a balance between
control and empowerment. We seek to identify whether a RAP exists that offers an
optimal mechanism14, i.e. the firm does better than under either the top-down or
full-empowerment approaches. We show that such a process must depart from the
assumption that the compensation scheme must be universally applied in a “fair”
manner, regardless of the difficulty of the initiative (Baker et al. 1988, Fehr et al.
14Otherwise said, we seek to determine whether it is possible to define a mechanism where the VP
offers specific contracts–resource levels and compensation– that induce the PM to reveal the true
project type (i.e. a fully separating equilibrium).
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2007). In other words, compensating the PM through a profit-sharing bonus is not
sufficient to get the “best” allocation (i.e. most effective use of his knowledge); the
bonus would need to be tailored to the initiative. Below we formally define such a
process for each of the stakeholders.
Definition 4. A resource allocation process utilizing an optimal mech-
anism. The VP maximizes her expected profit:
max
Rθd ,Rθe ,Wθd ,Wθd
E[Π] = Eθ[θP [Rθ]V −Rθ −Wθ]
s.t.
(i) E[U |θd, Rθd ,Wθd ] ≥ U
(ii) E[U |θe, Rθe ,Wθe ] ≥ U
(iii) E[U |θd, Rθd ,Wθd ] ≥ E[U |θd, Rθe ,Wθe ]
(iv) E[U |θe, Rθe ,Wθe ] ≥ E[U |θe, Rθd ,Wθd ]
A resource allocation process that tailors both resources and compensation to
the potential difficulty realizations (via an incentive feasible Bayesian mechanism),
requires a disclaimer: portraying such a process at parity with the prior processes
ignores the additional complexities and the (potentially prohibitive) costs associated
with implementing such an involved scheme (see Mihm 2010 for a discussion of the
complications associated with implementing incentive feasible, Bayesian mechanisms
in practice)15. Below we formally present the optimal resource allocation process.
Proposition 10. The optimal resource allocation process. The following
statements hold when the resource allocation process entails the VP tailoring both
resource allocations and compensation:
15To capture such added complexity and cost we can simply append a cost c to the objective
function, and as we explain in Proposition 11, such an addition gives rise to situations where it is
not optimal to employ such a process.
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(a) The output contingent portion of the compensation is always set to zero (k∗s = 0).








(i) w∗θd = kpR
∗
θd
(1− θdP [R∗θd ])














(iii) R∗θd solves P [Rθd ] =
q(1−V θdP ′[Rθd ])+kp(q−Rθd (θd−(1−q)θe)P
′[Rθd ])
kp(θd−(1−q)θe)




(iv) R∗θe = R
fb
θe
In an optimal RAP, fixed wages outperform any output-contingent compensation.
The logic is similar to our discussion in Proposition 7. The VP’s goal when imple-
menting such a resource allocation process is to categorize the initiatives, in order to
set the appropriate resource levels, and therefore, extract maximum surplus through
the use of tailored compensation. To accomplish her objectives, the VP designs and
offers a resource level and compensation that strictly adhere to the conditions outlined
in of Proposition 10 (b). These conditions accomplish the aforementioned objectives
as follows: for the most difficult initiatives (θd),the resource levels and wages offered,
are such that the project manager only expects to meet his reservation utility, whereas
a PM who realizes task difficulty θe, earns a surplus (on expectation). If the VP tried
to extract the full surplus from simpler, i.e. standard initiatives, such that the PM
only expected to receive his reservation utility, then the PM would choose the resource
level and compensation scheme designed for the difficult one (and earn a surplus)16.
As such the VP (by necessity) leaves some surplus for the PM.
16There is another option that would force the PM to execute the standard initiative (θe) and be
forced to his reservation utility. For such cases the VP purposefull designs the RAP to induce the
PM to opt-out of difficult initiatives and as a result the PM only undertakes standard initiatives.
We choose not to focus on those cases as they are counter to our focus on understanding resource
allocation processes that allow organizations to undertake initiatives with expected difficulty E[θ]
regardless of the actual realization of the difficulty.
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As advocated by recent studies in the NPD literature (Mihm 2010) and the Eco-
nomics literature (Baker et al. 1988, Fehr et al. 2007), the implementation of such
complex incentive mechanisms may entail an additional direct or indirect cost c, which
may render them infeasible or undesirable. Proposition 11 below establishes that pro-
vided the magnitude of c is small enough, the optimal mechanism remains beneficial
for initiatives with substantial expected task difficulty (i.e. low enough E[θ]).
Proposition 11. Resource allocation process.
(i) When there is no implementation cost associated with implementing tailored
compensation schemes and resource allocations, such a process dominates top-
down or bottom-up for any E[θ].
(ii) There exists a cost threshold c̄ ∈ R+ such that for all c ≥ c̄ tailored compen-
sation and resource allocations is less profitable than either top-down or full-
empowerment.
The potential issues that relate to the implementation of the optimal mechanism:
organizational fairness, 17 cost, and complexity, we ask the question: Is it possible
to construct a “next-best” resource allocation process that allows the firm to offer a
universally applied compensation scheme and only vary the resource level that the
PM chooses between? Such a process represents a well defined managerial practice
referred to as “strategic buckets” (Cooper et al. 2001, Chao and Kavadias 2008,
Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). We formally define such a process below:
Definition 5. A resource allocation process utilizing strategic buck-
ets. The VP maximizes her expected profit:
17We point out that implementing an optimal RAP as proposed internal to a single firm, translates
to a compensation plan for the PM where his compensation is explicitly contingent on the realization





E[Π] = Eθ[θP [Rθ]V −Rθ −W ]
s.t.
(i) E[U |θd, Rθd ,W ] ≥ U
(ii) E[U |θe, Rθe ,W ] ≥ U
(iii) E[U |θd, Rθd ,W ] ≥ E[U |θd, Rθe ,W ]
(iv) E[U |θe, Rθe ,W ] ≥ E[U |θe, Rθd ,W ]
Recently more firms have adopted a hierarchical resource allocation process, where
resources are “earmarked” for a particular type of initiative18. In such a setting, the
VP may associate the different difficulty initiatives into specific strategic buckets (e.g.
buckets aimed at funding initiatives that strengthen current product lines, or those
that stretch the organization into entirely new market segments, see Loch and Kava-
dias 2010). These practices have been advocated as a means to “protect” resources
for a “long enough” period of time so as the firm can undertake radical (difficult)
initiatives and see them come to fruition (Chao and Kavadias 2008). Our analysis
points to an alternative justification for employing strategic buckets that stems from
the need to offer implicit incentives to project managers in order to promote them to
make the most effective use of their expertise.
Proposition 12. A resource allocation process that uses strategic buck-
ets. When the VP chooses to use strategic buckets as the resource allocation process:
(a) The output contingent portion of the compensation is always set to zero (k∗s = 0).








18First hand conversations with executives at Fortune 500 companies have outlined processes
whereby they earmark specific funds for specific types of projects.
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(i) For θd ≤ θ′
(a) w∗ = kpR
∗
θd




(1− θeP [R∗θe ]) = R
∗
θd
(1− θeP [R∗θd ])
(ii) For θ′ < θd ≤ θ′′
(a) w∗ = kpR
∗
θd
















A strategic buckets allocation process works in concert with the organizational
norms (i.e. the penalty for failure) as follows: first, it provides a greater level of






), such that when coupled with the organiza-
tional penalty kp, accepting an R
∗
θe
allocation when θd is realized yields less than the
reservation utility for the PM. In other words, the ability to offer distinct resource
options creates an implicit “compensation” effect through the organizational norms
themselves (and in addition, provides a rationale for such penalties). This allows the
VP to adequately tailor the strategic buckets and ensure that the project manager
selects the correct one. This is a powerful insight regarding the ability of the firm to
define distinct buckets without necessitating distinct and explicit compensation (i.e.
wages) to appropriate the benefits. We characterize the benefits below by contrasting
the strategic buckets with the top down process.
Proposition 13. The choice between a top-down and strategic buckets
process.
(i) There exists a threshold θ̂ such that for all E[θ] < θ̂, the profits from imple-
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Figure 8: Resource allocation under full-empowerment and top-down resource allo-
cation processes.
(ii) For sufficiently low Π̂, the feasible set of initiatives under a strategic buckets
process is larger than under a top-down process.
(iii) A strategic buckets process weakly dominates a full-empowerment process for all
E[θ]19.
As we did in Proposition 9, in Proposition 13 we characterize the difference be-
tween delegating resource allocation via a strategic buckets process, and dictating
19When the set of potential difficulty levels for the initiative contains more than two elements,
then a strategic buckets RAP may not be dominant for all expected difficulty levels. In the Appendix
we offer such an example for three potential difficulty levels.
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resources via a top-down process, and we contrast the strategic buckets RAP with
the full-empowerment one. Again, we find that for initiatives with a higher poten-
tial difficulty, the use of delegation (i.e. the choice of between available buckets) to
capitalize on the knowledge of the PM becomes more beneficial. However, strate-
gic buckets make use of a very powerful aspect of delegation: they “earmark” the
resources for initiatives that may otherwise seem too far-fetched to receive any fund-
ing. Thus, although it may be hard to dictate these initiatives, a strategic buckets
RAP ensures enough funding for such long-shot projects. Therefore, the firm can
profitably go after initiatives that may be more difficult (i.e. more “radical”), in the
sense that they are not well grounded in the firm’s competencies and may represent
more difficulty to the firm.
Proposition 13 (iii) eludes to the power of using a strategic buckets RAP. Such
a process dominates a full-empowerment one for the following reason: both the full-
empowerment and the strategic buckets processes utilize a common compensation
scheme, albeit full-empowerment employs profit sharing, while a strategic buckets
process uses a fixed wage. The inefficiency of the full-empowerment process arises
because the common compensation is the only lever the VP has, i.e. the PM controls
the resource allocation, resulting in over-investment for initiatives with lower expected
difficulty. Yet, when the VP categorizes the resource allocation, and an appropriately
set wage, she can replicate any solution obtained through full-empowerment given
the control she has over the resource levels of the strategic buckets. However, it is
worthwhile to point out that, this result does not always hold when the project types
are defined with more granularity. In such cases, the lack of a clear cut dominance
stems from the fact that the VP needs to offer a premium to induce the proper sorting
of the initiatives into their respective buckets, and this premium may be too great to
allow the VP to sort the initiatives into all of the different buckets, i.e. even though
there are n type of difficulty for the initiative, the VP may only be able to segment
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the initiatives into n′ < n buckets. In the end, the loss from the premium and the
added need to sort the initiatives may result in a greater loss under the strategic
buckets RAP than the loss incurred through delegation. Thus, it may happen that
it is less costly to allow the PM to fully define the resources for the initiative on his
own, as opposed to inducing him to adopt a pre-defined funding option up front, i.e.
strategic buckets.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we set out to explore a fundamental question regarding resource allo-
cation: what resource allocation process should a firm use when undertaking a NPD
initiative? Since Bower’s (1970) early work regarding the resource allocation pro-
cesses in organizations, scholars have observed in numerous field studies the presence
of different approaches. Surprisingly enough, few studies have looked at when and
how such different processes should (and could) be implemented. Our study aims
to address this gap. We consider a problem setting where the senior management
of a firm aims to implement a key strategic NPD initiative. As articulated in the
prior literature, certain organizations allocate resources in a top-down fashion, i.e.
resource decisions are made at senior levels within the organization; while others fol-
low a bottom-up resource allocation process, where initiatives are outlined at senior
levels but the resource decisions are made by middle-management (project managers).
At the time funding decisions are made, rarely does senior management understand
the tasks required to execute the initiative as well as the project manager himself.
This difference between the stakeholders’ knowledge of the initiative (information
asymmetry), prompts a distinct agency setting that results from the fact that the
stakeholders face different consequences should the initiative fail (i.e. the firm in-
curs the full cost of resources, and the PM suffers career setbacks). To address the
71
inefficiencies associated with this agency setting, the VP faces a choice between em-
powerment and control. Control is maintained by dictating a fixed resource budget
to the PM, with the objective to efficiently allocate resources. Unfortunately such
efficiency comes at a cost; the VP rarely knows the exact difficulty of the initiative
and she needs to decide on budgets given this uncertainty. In contrast, empowerment
delegates the resource allocation decision to the PM, and represents the VP’s effort
to capitalize on the effective use of the PM’s specialized knowledge about executing
the initiative. Yet, delegation comes with its own cost as well, it requires substantial
incentive compensation in an effort to align the objectives of both stakeholders.
Our model analysis provides an operational perspective in support of Burgelman’s
(1983) early observation that no single project definition process (i.e. top-down or
bottom-up) is appropriate for all firms and all initiatives. We are able to identify
under what conditions each process applies. That is, firms should apply resource
allocation processes that maintain control, when their objective is to fund relatively
well known domains (initiatives with low expected difficulty), while delegating the
resource allocation decision is more beneficial when the domain is less known (ini-
tiatives with high expected difficulty). Yet, our most intriguing insight stems from
the pursuit of an optimal resource allocation process. In order to define such a pro-
cess we need to depart from the use of a single, common rule for compensation, i.e.
a common fixed wage or a common profit-sharing incentive. Admittedly, this adds
complexity in the implementation of such a process (Mihm 2010) and raises potential
issues of fairness (Fehr at el. 2007). Nonetheless, we characterize such a process as it
lends insight for feasible firm practices that could further improve resource allocation
when the associated implementation costs are not severe. More importantly though,
it gives rise to a related “next-best” process that has found much use in practice:
resource allocation via strategic buckets. Our results elaborate on the implications
of the resource allocation process on the firm’s ability to adapt its portfolio, and
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how such an ability is strongly dependent on the resource allocation process and the
structural context (incentives, decision rights and culture) of the firm.
Each firm’s choice of a RAP depends on the strategic objectives, the organizational
norms that define the PM’s consequences for failed initiatives, and how well senior
management understands the detailed tasks required to execute the initiative. We find
that for those firms wishing to fund relatively well known domains (standard tasks),
the benefits they incur by tailoring resource allocation levels to the task difficulty are
outweighed by the efficiency gained when senior management dictates the resource
allocation. However, when the information asymmetry is high, this may no longer
be the case. In such instances, of high asymmetry, the VP benefits from offering
incentives that align the PM’s interests with the overall firm objectives. When this is
the case, the gains realized from aligning the stakeholder objectives outweigh the cost
of incentives and the firm reaps benefits from effectively tailoring resource allocations.
There is a caveat, a firm with low tolerance for failure (i.e. a harsh penalty for failure)
may preclude the firm from achieving alignment on such high difficulty initiatives. In
a harsh environment, it may never be beneficial to delegate; the need to offset the
failure consequences makes it too costly to provide incentives that align the utility of
the PM with the objectives of the firm (utility of the VP).
Additionally, our research offers an alternative justification for the use of strategic
buckets, which is often observed in practice. Strategic buckets are widely cited as a
means to ensure that funds are earmarked for difficult (i.e. radical) initiatives. Gen-
erally, they are advocated based on forward looking statements (Chao and Kavadias
2008), or statements based on fear of mismanagement (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2008).
The logic is as follows: firms know they need to conduct radical (difficult) projects;
yet if they do not protect funds for radical projects for long enough periods of time, or
if those funds are not explicitly labeled for such difficult initiatives, then the funds will
get used elsewhere, i.e. on more incremental and short-term initiatives. Armed with
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…and with respect to the penalty?
The Feasible Sets for
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Figure 9: Resource allocation under full-empowerment and top-down resource allo-
cation processes. The left panel represents a lower penalty for failure and each panel
to the right represents the feasible sets with increasing penalties, where eventually as
shown in the right panel, the top-down feasible set is dominant as compared with the
full-empowerment one.
such a capability the firm can address the issue of what portion of projects should
be more radical or incremental. Our explanation for strategic buckets is somewhat
different: senior managers of NPD organizations are unsure of the exact difficulty of
the strategic initiative they aim to implement. In an effort to ensure that resources
are properly tailored to execute the appropriate difficulty initiative, such that the firm
does not only pursue incremental initiatives under the premise of more difficult ones,
senior management can use strategic buckets to segment the projects, and thus more
effectively fund them. In addition, this result highlights a positive side effect of hav-
ing at least some penalty for failure. Such organizational norms allow implicit means
by which the firm can manage the PM’s utility, and influence his decisions, without
implementing complex compensation, i.e. incentive feasible Bayesian mechanisms,
with non-linear, project type dependent compensation.
Finally, an important implication of the choice of the “right” resource allocation
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process, i.e. a RAP contingent on the context within which initiatives are executed,
is the firm’s ability to adapt its portfolio to a given strategy. Our results on the
feasible set of initiatives show that the choice of resource allocation process given the
organizational norms, dictates whether an initiative, and as such, part of the firm’s
strategy, can be executed. The feasible set of initiatives represents bounds on the
initiatives the firm can execute, and it is an analog to Markowitz’s (1952) notion
of an attainable set of investments that an individual investor can include in their
portfolio given a particular set of risk preferences. Thus, given a particular resource
allocation process, there is a feasible set of initiatives that the firm can fund (i.e
the maximum expected difficulty the firm can undertake for a given potential value).
Although the organizational norms impact the feasible set in a unidirectional manner
(i.e. regardless of the process, a higher penalty implies a smaller feasible set), the
impact is more severe when the resource allocation process is one of empowerment.
A graphical representation of this is shown in Figure 9.
In conclusion, our work places emphasis on the need for senior management to
consider operational details of NPD initiatives when determining the firm’s resource
allocation process. As a first step towards this direction, we bear limitations that open
potential avenues for future research. Future work needs to shed additional light on
the delegation of strategy definition (which initiatives to pursue) and account for
effects of competition. Furthermore, future work should also establish how certain
organizational norms, i.e. the penalty for failure, come to fruition, thus adding detail
to such a temporal process (Chassang 2010). Finally the effects of the collaborative
and cross-functional nature of innovation should come under scrutiny.
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CHAPTER IV
TOLERANCE FOR FAILURE AND INCENTIVES FOR
INNOVATION
4.1 Introduction
Most innovation or new product development (NPD) initiatives are managed in col-
laborative innovation teams (Roussel et al. 1991, Wheelwright and Clark 1996, Loch
and Terwiesch 2009)1. Collaborative innovation teams require different functional
or technical managers, such as marketing, operations, engineering, and R&D among
others, to allocate resources to a project (Sosa and Mihm 2008). Those resources are
deployed to execute project tasks, such as design, concept generation, prototyping,
and testing (Ulrich and Eppinger 2004), which are geared toward reducing technical
and market risk in order to ensure viable development.
While the use of collaborative innovation teams is a good way to spark innovation,
an organization can also influence the risk-taking behavior of the managers that
allocate resources to collaborative innovation projects. This is often accomplished
through monetary incentive schemes (e.g. performance based rewards and bonuses)
and/or through an organizational culture that tolerates failure (e.g. not penalizing
employees involved in failed innovation initiatives)2. However, blindly handing out
1The definition of “collaborative” will differ depending on the context and academic heritage of
the reader. Webster defines collaborative as, “produced or conducted by two or more parties working
together”. For our purposes, collaboration can be defined as shared control over critical project
decisions. One of the most well-known collaborative innovation initiatives was the development of
the Airbus A380. This project consisted of over 5,000 engineers and development personnel from 12
different functional areas and divisions (Sosa and Mihm 2008).
2An example of incentives for innovation exists at Google, where members of the Chrome web
browser development team were rewarded bonuses that totaled millions of dollars upon successful
development (Eustace 2009). Likewise, companies such as IDEO exhibit tolerance for failure when
they encourage employees to, “fail often to succeed sooner” in order to spark innovation (Thomke
2001).
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rewards or ignoring failures may not be appropriate in all settings. It is therefore
important to understand how incentives and tolerance for failure work in concert with
one another to influence managerial decision-making in new product development.
In this paper we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to study how rewards
and penalties impact the decisions of project managers engaged in a collaborative
innovation initiative. While a number of studies have explored the isolated effects
of rewards (Holt and Laury 2002, 2005) or penalties (Bolton and Zwick 1995) in the
general context of decision-making under risk, the combined effect of these levers
remains relatively unexplored. The few studies that do consider both rewards and
penalties do so in a setting where the probabilities associated with mixed gambles
are fixed (Birnbaum and Bahra 2007, Wu and Markle 2008) or the risk is faced by
one individual (Manso 2011, Ederer and Manso 2010). To our knowledge, our work is
the first to empirically explore the combined influence of rewards and penalties on a
collaborative innovation initiative. Furthermore, the majority of existing studies do
not consider risk that can be altered by the actions of the decision-maker, as is the
case in NPD projects.
NPD projects are defined by risk that can be reduced by the resources assigned to
a project, a feature we call endogenous project risk. This feature stands in contrast
with the (exogenous) risk faced by the typical financial investor or gambler that
is often cited in studies of decision-making under risk (Sutter 2007). In addition,
NPD projects often require input from and collaboration between multiple functional
managers. We define collaboration in terms of shared control over critical project
decisions, such as the amount of resources to invest in a project. These two facets of
NPD - endogenous project risk and collaboration between multiple functions - make
NPD a particularly novel setting for the study of incentives and tolerance for failure.
While endogenous project risk is often modeled theoretically (Laffont and Martimort
2002, Aghion and Tirole 1994), we believe our work is the first to provide an empirical
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understanding of decisions made under endogenous project risk.
Our study provides three results, one of which is intuitive while the other two
appear to be novel contributions to the literature. First, subjects choose to allocate
more resources when the reward is high or when the penalty is low. While this result is
intuitive, it does serve a purpose in that it shows that rewards and penalties behave as
expected when managers face endogenous project risk. Since most empirical studies
on rewards and penalties are carried out in settings where the decision maker cannot
directly influence the risk he/she faces, it seems important to confirm intuition in a
setting characterized by endogenous project risk.
Second, we find that the way in which project control is administered moderates
the effects of both rewards and penalties. When control over critical project decisions
is shared, subjects do not internalize the effects of reward or penalty as much as they
do when control rests with one individual. The implication is that managerial rewards
do not positively influence actions as much (and penalties do not negatively influence
actions as much) when the control of a project is shared between multiple functional
(or technical) managers. Effects associated with free riding (Kim and Walker 1984,
Siemsen et al. 2007) are often cited to explain that individuals invest at a lower
level when control is shared. The nature of our result is such that, in some cases,
individuals may actually invest at a higher level in a setting characterized by shared
control and either low rewards or high penalties.
Our third result highlights when and how subjects alter their appetite for risk
depending on project characteristics and the rewards/penalties offered by the firm.
When rewards and penalties are balanced so that both are high or both are low, sub-
jects tend to exhibit a greater risk appetite. Conversely, when rewards and penalties
are not balanced, subjects tend to scale back their risk appetite. This result is par-
ticularly interesting because shifting risk appetite may have unintended consequences
if it leads managers to misalign themselves with corporate strategy (regardless of
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whether that strategy calls for more or less risk appetite).
Taken together, these insights have important implications for senior executives
charged with delivering innovation and creating growth. A common refrain among
these executives is the need to manage resource allocation and risk taking on the part
of their employees. While our first instinct is to assume that firms should always
encourage risk taking (perhaps because of the potential value associated with risky
innovation initiatives), it is important to remember that there are many instances
in which the firm would do well to encourage less risk appetite (as is often the case
with process improvement programs). A simple anecdote from practice highlights this
point. One senior executive at a large multinational service company stated that, “It
is important that our project managers align their risk appetite with our need to
grow the business in key markets. Too often we find that project risk is cited as a
reason for not engaging in what was thought to be a promising project. It leaves us
wondering if perhaps we are penalizing them too much, focusing them on the short
term, and not rewarding them for taking appropriate risks” (Sevillano 2011).
4.2 Related Literature and Theory Development
Our study is related to the literature on rewards, penalties, and control in organi-
zations. As we shall see below, researchers in economics, psychology, organization
theory, and new product development have contributed to these themes in different
ways. These contributions tend to be focused on either economic (Holmstrom 1979,
Eisenhardt 1989) or psychological (Miner 2005) mechanisms.
4.2.1 The Positive Effect of Rewards
Studies that highlight a positive influence of rewards are often based on agency the-
ory - the premise that economic agents and their principals have diverging interests
and it is costly or impossible to perfectly monitor the actions of the agent (Laffont
and Mortimort 2002). The principal should therefore provide a reward (incentive)
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to encourage the agent to take action that is positively aligned with the principal’s
objective (Gibbons 1998, 2005, Kaplan and Henderson 2005). There are a number
of theoretical agency models that highlight how rewards and incentives positively in-
fluence behavior (Holmstrom 1979, Pendergrast 1999, Lazear 2000, Manso 2010). In
addition, there is a significant body of work aimed at empirically verifying the posi-
tive influence of rewards predicated by agency theory (Lazear 1996, Ichniowski Shaw
and Prennushi 1997, Lazear 2000). In R&D and product development settings, the
positive effect of rewards has been highlighted in the context of hierarchical planning
(Anderson and Joglekar 2005) and strategy implementation (Loch and Tapper 2001),
among others.
Psychologists have also studied the positive influence of rewards, albeit from a
broader perspective related to motivation (Miner 2005). One aspect of motivation
deals with expectancy, or the belief that rewards increase the strength (valence) of
the cause and effect relationship between desired actions and outcomes (Vroom 1964,
Porter and Lawler 1968). Similarly, rewards can act as a positive reinforcement mech-
anism when the desired performance is clearly stated and rewards are contingent on
that performance (Skinner 1953, Hamner 1974, 2005). The positive effect of rewards
can also be credited to an individual’s need for achievement (McClelland, Atkinson,
Clark and Lowell 1953, Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Achievement theories are based
on the fact that individuals strive to be perceived as high ability, and a reward that
can be attributed to success reaffirms that perception since, ”success is ascribed to
high ability and hard work, and failure is attributed to low ability” (Weiner 1992, p.
549). Considered together, this work suggests that rewards have a positive effect on
effort.
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4.2.2 The Negative Effect of Penalties
Rewards only represent one side of the coin when it comes to using incentives to
influence behavior. An alternative is to use a penalty or punishment as negative
reinforcement. Psychologists have reasoned that penalties have a negative influence
on behavior because of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and
Kahneman 1981). In new product development settings, loss aversion may magnify
the implicit costs or penalties incurred by managers. For example, Chao et al. (2009)
show how a higher implicit cost paid by a manager that runs over budget leads the
manager to invest less in NPD projects. Similarly, Mihm (2010) shows that higher
penalty paid by engineers that design components with cost overruns lead to less
effort on the part of those engineers. These papers and others like them (Hutchison-
Krupat and Kavadias 2010) all focus on the negative effect of penalties (“the stick”)
as opposed to the positive effect of rewards (“the carrot”).
Beyond the choice of “the carrot or the stick” as a means of positive or negative
reinforcement (Dickinson 2001, Andreoni Harbaugh and Vesturlund 2003), there is a
related stream of literature that cites a firm’s tolerance for failure (or lack thereof) as
another lever that affects employee actions. Low tolerance for failure has been shown
to decrease investment in innovative activities in both theoretical models (Manso
2011) and in empirical settings (Ederer and Manso 2010, Tian and Wang 2009).
Together, this stream of literature suggests that penalties have a negative effect on
effort.
4.2.3 The Effect of Shared Control
For our purposes, control is a function of whether a manager maintains individual
responsibility and accountability for a project as opposed to sharing the responsi-
bility and accountability with another manager. While the direct effects of rewards
and penalties are relatively straight forward, the effect of shared control is less so.
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In particular, it is not immediately obvious how control influences the relationship
between rewards/penalties and effort. Studies that cite a negative moderating effect
of shared control tend to focus on free-riding (Kim and Walker 1984, Siemsen et al.
2007) as the mechanism that dampens the effects of rewards or penalties. In our con-
text, free-riding occurs if an individual in a shared control setting invests less than
a “fair share” of resources (Kim and Walker 1984). One reason that free-riding may
occur in a shared control setting is that uncertainty regarding the actions of other
players involved in a strategic interaction leads each player to invest at a lower level
(Holmstrom 1982).
On the other hand, a number of studies cite a positive moderating effect of shared
control due to the diffusion of responsibility/accountability (Clark 1974) or percep-
tions of “risk-as-value” (Clark, Crockett, and Archer 1971, Hsee and Weber 1997).
The former can be interpreted as a form of risk pooling that takes place when multiple
individuals share control or engage in an activity together, while the latter is based on
the fact that society (and by extension social entities such as teams) value risk-taking
over cautious behavior. Siemsen (2008) provides an example of such behavior in the
context of NPD as it relates to design engineers purposefully undertaking difficult
(risky) projects so they can signal their skill. Based on the conflicting arguments
supported by free-riding, diffusion of responsibility, and risk-as-value, we do not offer
an a-priori hypothesis regarding the moderating role of shared control.
4.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We designed and implemented a controlled laboratory experiment to study the argu-
ments set forth above. In what follows we present a simple model that serves as the
foundation of our experiment. We then go on to describe the decision, treatments,
and other procedural details related to the experiment.
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4.3.1 A Model of Endogenous Project Risk with Reward and Penalty
One of the distinguishing characteristics of innovation and new product development
is the considerable risk that managers face during project execution. This risk can be
reduced (albeit not entirely) when a manager allocates resources to a project. We refer
to this aspect of NPD projects as endogenous project risk. While there is a substantial
volume of literature that evaluates risky allocation decisions (Levy 1994, Gneezy and
Potters 1997, Sutter 2007, Charness and Gneezy 2010), the majority of these studies
consider the risk associated with the investment as independent (exogenous) of the
investment itself. While this makes sense in circumstances such as the individual
investor or a gambler, this may not make sense when evaluating the firm’s internal
operations, as is the case when assigning resources to a NPD project. In most NPD
projects, the manager (or managers) who oversee the project, and who are subject
to receiving a reward or a penalty based on the outcome, can manage the exposure
they have to risk.
Consider a setting in which a single manager has control over the resources al-
located to a project. Let p(r) = r/(θ + r) be the probability that the project is
successful given a resource allocation of r3. The parameter θ is project specific and
captures risk that is present regardless of the resources allocated to the project. If the
project is successful, it delivers a value v to the firm and if it fails it delivers no value
to the firm. One can think of v as the discounted revenue stream generated by the
project upon successful development. Two things are important to note here. First,
the probability of success for the project is increasing in the resources allocated to the
project. This captures the endogenous project risk that is characteristic of product
development. Second, for a given level of resource investment, projects with higher
3We consider ”resource allocation” to be a proxy for the many disparate activities that serve
to reduce risk (increase the likelihood of success) for a project. These may include things such as
resources dedicated to understanding customer needs (Griffin and Hauser 1993) or the number of
prototyping tests to run (Terwiesch and Loch 2004), among others.
83
θ have lower probability of success compared to projects with lower θ. We therefore
interpret θ to be a proxy for the implicit project risk (i.e. so-called “incremental”
or “radical” initiatives). A project manager with individual control over the project






α(v − r) if the project is successful
−βr if the project fails
where α is the incentive parameter that characterizes the level of reward given to the
manager if the project is a success and β is the tolerance for failure parameter that
characterizes the level of penalty imposed on the manager if the project is a failure.
The reward is proportional to the project’s profit and the penalty is proportional to
the resources consumed by a failed project.
In a collaborative innovation initiative with shared control, each manager must
account for his resource allocation decision as well as that of his counterpart. Suppose





α(v − ri − rj) if the project is successful
−β(ri + rj) if the project fails
where ri is the resource allocation decision of manager i and rj is the resource allo-
cation decision of manager j. In the case of shared control, the probability that the
project is successful depends on the resource allocation decisions of both managers.
Therefore, we have p(ri, rj) = (ri + rj)/(θ + ri + rj) in the case of shared control.
4.3.2 The Decision
Subjects were asked to decide the level of resources to invest in each of 8 projects
that were presented in sequence. We randomized the order in which we presented the
projects in order to avoid framing or ordering effects. In accordance with the model
described above, subjects were told that their investment would alter the probability
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of success for the project. For each subject, each of the 8 projects was presented in a
table that included i) the option to invest between 0 and 25 resources to the project,
ii) probability of project success based on the investment decision, iii) reward if the
project is successful, iv) probability of project failure, and v) penalty imposed if the
project fails. In the Appendix we provide the exact instructions presented to subjects
along with a sample question.
4.3.3 Experimental Design and Treatments
Our experimental design consists of treatments for i) reward, ii) penalty, iii) project
risk, and iv) project control. We implemented each treatment at two levels leading to
a 2x2x2x2 factorial design. Furthermore, we varied three of the treatments (reward,
penalty, and project risk) within subject and one of the treatments (project control)
between subjects. We did this for two reasons. First, this experimental design allows
us to limit the number of questions asked of each subject to only 8. Second, we
believe that subjects can focus more clearly on each question if they are not asked to
switch between a setting where they are the sole decision maker and one where they
are one of two decision makers for the project. This also allows us to frame all of the
qualification questions in a single context and test that they understand that context.
Both of these experimental design decisions limit the cognitive burden placed on each
subject during our experiment. Figure 10 presents a summary of our treatments and
experimental conditions. Below, we describe each treatment in greater detail.
4.3.4 Project Control
The treatment for project control was implemented between subjects by randomly
assigning subjects to one of two groups: individual control or shared control. In the
individual control group, subjects were told that their decision alone would determine
the probability of success for the project, and therefore, their potential reward or
penalty. In the shared control group, subjects were told that the probability of
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Figure 10: Experimental Design.
success was determined by the resources that they assigned as well as those resources
assigned by another player. They were told that ultimately the total number of
resources assigned by both players would determine the potential reward or penalty
they would receive, and the probability of each respective outcome.
We informed subjects in the shared control group that the other player was given
the exact same information as they were. This creates common knowledge and avoids
any superfluous asymmetries between subjects. For the shared control group we also
scaled the resource allocation options offered to the subjects by a factor of two. This
ensures that the amount of reward or penalty received by the subjects is equivalent
under individual and shared control. We can therefore easily compare the decisions
that a subject makes under individual control with the same decision that a subject
makes under shared control.
86
4.3.5 Project Risk
The treatment for project risk was implemented at two levels within subject by al-
tering the relationship between the resources allocated to the project and the prob-
ability of success. The functional form the used for the probability of success is
p(r) = r/(θ+ r). As before, θ is a scaling parameter that characterizes how risky the
project is (higher θ representing a higher risk project) and r represents the resources
allocated to the project (either individually or shared). The low risk treatment is
characterized by θ = 15 and the high risk treatment uses θ = 90.
Figure 11 depicts a low-risk project and a high-risk project for a typical question.
As is evident from the figure, to achieve a given probability of success, the subject
would have to allocate more resources in a high-risk project. Similarly, for a given level
of resource allocation, the probability of success for a low-risk project is always higher
(this condition implies that low risk projects first-order stochastically dominate high
risk projects). Furthermore, a high-risk project cannot come close to 100% probability
of success for any level of resource allocation while a low risk project comes a lot closer
to 100% probability of success with a high enough allocation of resources.
4.3.6 Reward
The treatment for reward was implemented at two levels within subject. We altered
the percentage of project profit earned by the subject if the project is successful. For
each project, the reward is given by α(1000−r) where α is the reward percentage and
r is the allocated resource (individual or shared). This structure corresponds well with
the typical profit sharing or bonus-based incentives used by many firms in practice.
Our reward is based on a percentage of project profit because most organizations use
performance-based rewards (incentives or bonuses) along this vein. The low reward




Figure 2: Endogenous Project Risk (Probability of Success 
Depends on Allocated Resources) 
Reward 
The treatment for reward was implemented at two levels within subject.  We altered the percentage of 
project profit earned by the subject if the project is successful.  For each project, the reward is given by 
1000  where  is the reward percentage and r is the allocated resource (individual or shared). This 
structure corresponds well with the typical profit sharing or bonus-based incentives used by many firms in 
practice.  Our reward is based on a percentage of project profit because most organizations use 
performance-based rewards (incentives or bonuses) along this vein.  The low reward treatment is 0.1 
and the high reward treatment is 1.0. 
Penalty 
The treatment for penalty was implemented at two levels within subject.  We altered the percentage of 
project costs (allocated resources) that the subject would be penalized if the project failed.  For each 
project, the penalty is given by –  where  is the penalty percentage and r is the allocated resource 
(individual or shared). This structure captures the “tolerance for failure” (or lack therefore) that many 
practitioners speak of when they try to create a culture of innovation within their firms.  We implemented 
Figure 11: Endogenous Project Risk (Probability of Success Depends on Allocated
Resources).
4.3.7 Penalty
Th t eatment for penalty was implemented at two levels within subject. W altered
the percentage of project costs (allocated resources) that the subject would be penal-
ized if the project failed. For each project, the penalty is given by −βr where β is
the penalty percentage and r is the allocated resource (individual or shared). This
structure captures the “tolerance for failure” (or lack therefore) that many practi-
tioners speak of when they try to create a culture of innovation ithin their fir s.
We implemented the penalty based on the allocated resources because our research
question is geared toward understanding the scale of the project from the perspective
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of the firm rather than the individual’s cost of effort. The low penalty (high toler-
ance for failure) treatment is β = 0.1 and the high penalty (low tolerance for failure)
treatment is β = 1.0.
4.3.8 Qualification and Incentives
We implemented a series of qualification questions and incentives to ensure that sub-
jects fully understand the task at hand and subjects remain engaged throughout the
duration of the experiment (the full 8 questions that they are asked to answer).
Qualification questions were aimed at ensuring that subjects understood each
dimension of the problem. As such, in each of the treatments for project control
(individual and shared) we presented the subjects with a shortened version of the
tables they would see for each project. We then asked them specific questions that
revealed whether they understood how each variable interacted with the others (sam-
ple qualification questions are shown in the Appendix). For the shared control group
all questions were phrased to emphasize that there would always be two decision
makers affecting the outcome of the project. The shared control treatment required
an additional dimension of understanding and is therefore more complex, which is
evident from the fact that fewer subjects qualified in the shared control group.
Financial incentives were used to ensure that subjects paid attention throughout
the experiment. Each subject was paid a fixed fee for participating in the experiment.
In addition, each subject was told that they had the chance to receive a bonus of up to
$200 depending on their performance during the experiment. We followed a standard
lottery procedure advocated in the literature to implement the bonus (Camerer 2003).
Following the completion of the experiment we randomly selected one of the 8 projects
and simulated the results using the choices made by each subject. Based on the results
of the simulation, the top five performers (in terms of net gain) were credited 100, 70,
60, 40, and 35 lottery tickets, respectively. All other subjects were each credited 1
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lottery ticket. This structure ensures that the top performing subjects have a higher
probability of winning the bonus.
4.3.9 Subject Pool
All subjects were U.S. residents selected through the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
service. Mechanical Turk has become widespread in experimental and behavioral eco-
nomics (Paolacci et al. 2010) and it offers a number of advantages over traditional
laboratory experiments. First, Mechanical Turk offers access to a heterogeneous pop-
ulation, which more closely resembles the general working population in the U.S. In
contrast, most laboratory experiments have homogeneous populations that often con-
sist of undergraduate students. Second, Mechanical Turk may offer stronger internal
validity compared to laboratory experiments because anonymity avoids experimenter
bias (Orne 1962) and interactions between subjects (Edlund et al. 2009).
Subjects in our experiment were of an average age of 32 with 58% of the subjects
having completed an undergraduate degree. Of those that completed an undergrad-
uate degree, over 50% of subjects had more than 4 years of work experience. Overall
38% of subjects passed their respective qualification questions (31% in the shared
control group and 46% in the individual control group). The lower percentage in the
shared control group reflects the additional dimension of understanding required by
subjects in that treatment. Specifically, subjects in the shared control group had to
understand the same dimensions as the individual control group (reward, penalty and
the relationship between resource allocation and likelihood of success) but they also
had to recognize that these dimensions were affected by their decision as well as the
decisions made by another subject. After checking for completeness of the responses,
our sample has usable data from 152 subjects (85 in the individual control group and




In this section we describe the results of our experiment. We first discuss how rewards
and penalties impact resource allocation decisions, then go on to discuss how rewards
and penalties influence risk appetite.
4.4.1 How Rewards and Penalties Impact Resource Allocation
To understand how our variables of interest impact resource allocation decisions, we
ran three regressions with different specifications (see Figure 12). Specification 1 tests
the interactions between reward, penalty, and project type for the “individual control”
group only. Specification 2 tests the same interactions for the “shared control” group
only. Specification 3 includes the effect of project control in addition to the others
listed above. Because our data consist of within and between subject variables, our
statistical analysis is performed using a generalized linear model that accounts for
repeated measures at the subject level. Each regression uses ”resource allocation” as
the dependent variable.
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Figure 3: Regression results with “resource allocation” as the dependent variable 
 
 
For the individual control group (Specification 1), the direct effects of reward and penalty are 
consistent with the discussion in Section 2.  High rewards or low penalties lead to higher resource 
allocation on the part of the manager.  In addition, the interaction between the project risk and reward is 
significant in the individual control group, suggesting that the positive effect of reward is even greater 
when the project risk is high.  For the shared control group (Specification 2), the interaction between 
project risk and reward is no longer significant.  Comparing Specification 1 and 2, it is evident that while 
the direct effects are directionally consistent, the magnitude of the effect associated with either the reward 
Individual Control Shared Control Combined
1 2 3
Parameter Estimate (std. err.) Estimate (std. err.) Estimate (std. err.)
(Intercept) 4.969 (0.463)*** 8.507 (0.509)*** 4.686 (0.408)***
[Penalty=H] ‐3.247 (0.712)*** ‐1.302 (0.694)* ‐1.538 (0.610)**
[Reward=H] 1.718 (0.756)** 1.489 (0.674)** 0.565 (0.584)
[Risk=H] 3.365 (0.706)*** 4.608 (0.728)*** 4.33 (0.657)***
[Reward=H] * [Penalty=H] 1.047 (0.716) ‐0.53 (0.741) 0.352 (0.521)
[Risk=H] * [Penalty=H] ‐1.188 (0.873) ‐0.455 (0.762) ‐0.865 (0.593)




Number of subjects 85 67 152
Number of observations 680 536 1216
***p≤0.01, **p≤0.05, *p≤0.10
Figure 12: Regression results with “resource allocation” as the dependent variable.
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For the individual control group (Specification 1), the direct effects of reward and
penalty are consistent with the discussion in Section 2. High rewards or low penalties
lead to higher resource allocation on the part of the manager. In addition, the in-
teraction between the project risk and reward is significant in the individual control
group, suggesting that the positive effect of reward is even greater when the project
risk is high. For the shared control group (Specification 2), the interaction between
project risk and reward is no longer significant. Comparing Specification 1 and 2, it
is evident that while the direct effects are directionally consistent, the magnitude of
the effect associated with either the reward or penalty is less when control is shared.
The same is true regarding the interaction between the project risk and the reward;
the effect is directionally consistent, but the magnitude is substantially less (so much
so that it is no longer significant in the case of shared control). These results suggest
that project control (individual or shared) interacts with reward and/or penalty.
When we include all treatments in one regression (Specification 3) we see that,
indeed, there are significant interaction effects between project control, reward, and
penalty. When subjects have shared control, the positive relationship between rewards
and resource allocation are muted. In fact, when compared to the effect present in
the individual control group, rewards do not seem to matter as much under shared
control. Similarly, when subjects have shared control, the negative relationship be-
tween penalties and resource allocation is significantly mitigated. This moderating
effect comes with an intercept change along with a slope change. The interaction
effects are depicted graphically in Figure 13.
The results above suggest that when control of the project is shared, subjects
do not internalize the effects of reward or penalty as much as they do when the
control rests with one individual. This is important because most organizations use
cross-functional teams to carry out innovation projects and those teams often exist
within some form of shared control (e.g. matrix project organizations). It seems that
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Figure 13: Interaction Effects Between Control, Reward, and Penalty.
shared control leads to a form of free-riding (Holms rom 1982) ly if rewards are
high or penalties are low. Conv rsely, when rewards are low or pen lties ar high,
shar d con rol ac ually driv s higher resource a location. This suggests hat diffusion
of responsibility or risk-as-value dominates when rewards are lo or penalties ar high
in a shared control setting.
One final thing to note from our regressions is that project risk is significant for all
regression specifications. Subjects choose to invest at a higher when the project risk
is high. This result seems odd at first glance because one would expect a risk-averse
manager to invest at a lower level when facing higher risk. However, because our
setting is characterized by endogenous project risk, subjects can actually lower the
risk they face by investing more resources. This suggests that there is an “acceptable”
level of risk that the manager is willing to take on for each project and for each
organization (i.e. for each combination of reward and penalty). Understanding the
manager’s appetite for risk is the focus of the section that follows.
4.4.2 How Rewards and Penalties Impact Risk Appetite
Motivated by the discussion above, we now turn our attention to exploring how
rewards and penalties influence risk appetite, which requires us to specify a model of
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decision-making under risk. The two most well studied theories related to decision-
making under risk are expected utility theory (Morgenstern and Von Neumann 1947)
and prospect theory (Khaneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Khaneman 1992).
Figure 14 presents the coefficient of risk aversion and the resulting error achieved
when we fit our experimental data to each of four popular utility forms advocated
in the literature. For each utility form, we fit the coefficient of risk aversion by
minimizing the error between predicted allocation and observed allocation for each of




Figure 5: Fitted Coefficient of Risk Aversion and Relative Error 
 
Based on the results presented in Figure 5, we choose a power utility as the form to study the 
effects of rewards and penalties on risk appetite.  We used the power utility for two reasons.  First, the 
power utility is the most common form used in the literature of decision-making under risk (Smith 1995, 
Smith and Nau 1995).  Second, although the exponential utility performs marginally better in terms of 
error, the power utility function performs sufficiently well and is more parsimonious.  Using a power 
utility (and assuming that each subject made utility maximizing decisions) we can calculate the 
coefficient of risk aversion that is implied by the choices our subjects made.  Thus, we can transform our 
current dependent variable (resources allocated) into a new dependent variable (coefficient of risk 
aversion).5  In the Appendix, we provide a detailed explanation of this procedure along with a sample 
calculation. 
                                                 
5  This is essentially the same procedure followed by most classic studies of decision-making under risk.  Since risk aversion is a 
latent parameter that cannot be measured directly, it must be inferred from choices made between lotteries of varying risk. 
Figure 14: Fitted Coefficient of Risk Aversion and Relative Error.
Based on the results presented in Figure 14, we choose a power utility as the form
to study the effects of rewards and penalties on risk appetite. We used the power
utility for two reasons. First, the power utility is the most common form used in the
4Most of the models presented in Figure 14 have additional parameters bey d the coefficient of
risk aversion. In these cases, we fix those additional parameters at values most commonly advocated
in the literature. As a robustness test, we also fit these utility models with all parameters free. This
exercise often resulted in parameter values well outside the accepted range reported in prior studies.
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literature of decision-making under risk (Smith 1995, Smith and Nau 1995). Second,
although the exponential utility performs marginally better in terms of error, the
power utility function performs sufficiently well and is more parsimonious. Using a
power utility (and assuming that each subject made utility maximizing decisions) we
can calculate the coefficient of risk aversion that is implied by the choices our subjects
made. Thus, we can transform our current dependent variable (resources allocated)
into a new dependent variable (coefficient of risk aversion)5. In the Appendix, we
provide a detailed explanation of this procedure along with a sample calculation.
With our new dependent variable we can learn how project control and project
risk interact with the various combinations of reward and penalty to determine the
coefficient of risk aversion (i.e. risk appetite) that each subject adopts for different
project settings. Figure 15 shows the results when we use “coefficient of risk aversion”
as the dependent variable. As before, specification 1 tests the interactions between
reward, penalty, and project risk for the “individual control” group only. Specification
2 tests the same interactions for the ”shared control” group only. Specification 3
includes the effect of project control in addition to the others listed above.
In all specifications, penalty has a significant negative effect on the coefficient
of risk aversion, suggesting that penalties make subjects more risk averse. This ef-
fect comes about because subjects want to avoid the negative payoff associated with
penalties when the project fails. Rewards also have a negative effect on the coefficient
of risk aversion, albeit only significant in the case of individual control. This suggests
that subjects want to ensure that the project succeeds in order to receive the reward,
particularly when they make decisions alone. Taken together, these results suggest
that endogenous project risk may create a situation in which subjects curb their risk
appetite when either rewards or penalties are higher.
5This is essentially the same procedure followed by most classic studies of decision-making under
risk. Since risk aversion is a latent parameter that cannot be measured directly, it must be inferred
from choices made between lotteries of varying risk.
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With our new dependent variable we can learn how project control and project risk interact with 
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control in addition to the others listed above. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Regression results with “coefficient of risk aversion” as the dependent variable 
 
 
In all specifications, penalty has a significant negative effect on the coefficient of risk aversion, 
suggesting that penalties make subjects more risk averse.  This effect comes about because subjects want 
to avoid the negative payoff associated with penalties when the project fails.  Rewards also have a 
negative effect on the coefficient of risk aversion, albeit only significant in the case of individual control.  
This suggests that subjects want to ensure that the project succeeds in order to receive the reward, 
particularly when they make decisions alone.  Taken together, these results suggest that endogenous 
project risk may create a situation in which subjects curb their risk appetite when either rewards or 
penalties are higher. 
Individual Control Shared Control Combined
1 2 3
Parameter Estimate (std. err.) Estimate (std. err.) Estimate (std. err.)
Intercept 2.225 (0.099)*** 1.419 (0.124)*** 2.289 (0.112)***
[Penalty=H] ‐0.562 (0.176)*** ‐0.769 (0.235)*** ‐0.737 (0.186)***
[Reward=H] ‐0.573 (0.209)*** ‐0.235 (0.215) ‐0.194 (0.182)
[Risk=H] 0.418 (0.322) ‐0.135 (0.204) 0.115 (0.221)
[Reward=H] * [Penalty=H] 1.188 (0.269)*** 0.872 (0.304)*** 1.048 (0.202)***
[Risk=H] * [Penalty=H] ‐0.345 (0.285) 0.086 (0.205) ‐0.155 (0.184)




Number of subjects 85 67 152
Number of observations 680 536 1216
***p≤0.01, **p≤0.05, *p≤0.10
Figure 15: Regression results with “coefficient of risk aversion” as the dependent
variable.
A particularly interesting insight from our regression analysis is the significant
interaction between reward and penalty in all regression specifications. Figure 16,
depicts this interaction for the combined sample, and it highlights the importance of
balance between rewards and penalties. Balance between reward and penalty occurs
in situations in hich rewards and penalties are both high (or conversely rewards
and penalties are both low). When rewards and penalties are balanced, managers are
willing to assume more risk. When rewards and penalties are imbalanced, managers
become more risk averse.
The result above is particularly interesting because it brings to light the levers
that must be used if the firm wants to drive higher or lower risk appetite. Since there
are situations in which either of these may be desirable, it makes sense to set rewards
and penalties in a manner that is aligned with the firm’s strategy. For example, if
the firm’s strategy is to enter a new (unknown) product market, it would do well
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Figure 7: How the balance between reward and penalty impact risk appetite 
The result above is particularly interesting because it brings to light the levers that must be used if 
the firm wants to drive higher or lower risk appetite. Since there are situations in which either of these 
may be desirable, it makes sense to set rewards and penalties in a manner that is aligned with the firm’s 
strategy.  For example, if the firm’s strategy is to enter a new (unknown) product market, it would do well 
to balance rewards and penalties so that managers align their risk appetite with the risk that is sure to 
come in a new market.  Conversely, if the firm’s strategy is to successfully implement a process 
improvement initiative, it might make more sense to purposefully imbalance rewards and penalties so that 
managers lower their risk appetite. 
 
Figure 16: How the balance between reward and penalty impact risk appetite.
to balance rewards and penalties so that managers align their risk appetite with the
risk that is sure to come in a new marke . Co v rsely, if the firm’s strategy is to
successfully implement a process improvement initiative, it might make more sense
to purposefully imbalance rewards and penalties so that managers lower their risk
appetite.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to evaluate the effects of (positive
and negative) incentives on managerial decision making within the context of new
product development. An important aspect that differentiates our study from others
(and aligns it with the practice of new product development) is the manner in which
resources are critically linked to the probability of success. Rather than decouple
the probability of success from resource allocation (as is often done in experiments
associated with decision-making under risk), our experiment links resource allocation
directly to likelihood of success.
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Recently, scholars have taken note that some effects studied in behavioral experi-
ments may be lost (or caused) by the practice of “decoupling” specific factors within
an experiment. An example is the recent work of Wu and Markle (2008) that ob-
jects to some claims of prospect theory based on the separability of gains and losses.
Along the same lines, we question the separability between the likelihood of success
of a project and the resources that are allocated to it. Our work is similar to others
(Holt and Laury 2002) that show how risk aversion is not fixed for an individual;
rather it depends on the context in which the individual makes decisions. For Holt
and Laury (2002) this context is the individual’s wealth. For our experiment the
context is multidimensional, involving the interaction of rewards and penalties. We
point out how rewards and penalties can be purposefully balanced or imbalanced to
alter the risk appetite of the manager. This is in the same spirit as Akerlof and
Kranton (2005), who highlight that including a person’s “identity” (in the sense that
preferences define one’s identity), as a variable that can be altered is an important
and often overlooked aspect of current studies.
While the relationship between our research and existing studies is certainly im-
portant, the real value of our results lie in the insights that allow us to better under-
stand the managerial context in which new product development occurs. Firms have
a limited number of levers they can use to influence the implementation and manage-
ment of new product development activities. These levers consist of the managerial
control that is granted to project managers, the explicit incentives that are offered,
and the implicit penalties that evolve based on the culture of the organization or the
tone that is set by the senior management. These factors do not act in isolation, yet
surprisingly little has been done to explore their interactions.
Our results show that, as predicted, rewards have a positive effect on resource
allocation while penalties have a negative effect on resource allocation. If project
control is shared between two managers, the link between either reward or penalty
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and the resource allocation decision is not as strong. The implication is that the
positive effects of rewards and the negative effects of penalties are muted when control
is shared in a collaborative innovation initiative. Although this intuition is echoed in
models of free riding, it is worthwhile to point out that the result in our experiment is
more nuanced. Free-riding seems to dominate when rewards are high or penalties are
low in a shared control setting. However, when rewards are low or penalties are high,
shared control drives managers to invest more than when they maintain individual
control.
We also show when and how subjects may alter their risk appetite in response
to the incentives that are offered and the penalty for failure that manifests itself in
the culture of the firm. Our analysis of the manager’s risk appetite is not aimed at
advocating more (or less) risk taking; rather it provides insight into how the firm
might influence risk appetite given the firm’s objectives for collaborative innovation.
Figure 17 depicts how a manager’s risk appetite differs based on the rewards offered
within either a low or high penalty organization. When rewards are balanced with
organizational penalties, the manager will tend to take more risk. Alternatively im-
balanced rewards and penalties elicit less risk appetite on the part of the manager.
While there are multiple avenues to arrive at increased or decreased risk appetite,
they are not all equal. Depending of the particular mix of rewards and penalties,
managers may invest more or less, and the firm may retain a higher or lower share of
profits when projects succeed.
These insights have significant short and long term implications for the firm. The
penalties imposed on managers emerge from the organizational culture, which is, for
all intents and purposes, fixed in the short term (Schein 2010). As such, the firm
can only alter incentives (rewards) in the short term. Changing penalties requires
cultural change, which is usually a long term undertaking. To increase manager’s





Figure 8: Implication of Balanced or Imbalanced Rewards and Penalties 
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Figure 17: Implication of Balanced or Imbalanced Rewards and Penalties.
culture of penalty in which they operate. Clearly, when promoting risk taking, a
low penalty environment is preferred to high penalty environment, since the latter
requires that the firm forfeit a large portion of the profits in order to elicit such risk
preferences. Doing so may prompt the firm to forego otherwise attractive projects,
as the net benefit to the firm no longer justifies the risk. This may, in the end act as
a bound on the firm’s ability to expand its innovation portfolio. If this is the case it
may be wise for the firm to set forth a plan to make the organizational climate within
which the project managers operate more tolerant of failure.
Economic growth depends on successful innovation and new product development,
and most innovation initiatives require significant collaboration between individuals.
Our work is but one step toward an understanding of how incentives and tolerance for




For A.1 through A.3 ρ = 0 (in A.4. we relax this assumption). We also note that
we have normalized the reservation utility of the functional specialists (following
convention, we will term the functional specialists “agents” for the rest of the analysis)
to zero and we make the assumption that the firm can not “sell the firm” to the agents.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1 The expected utility of either (symmetric) agent under




, i ∈ {m, t} and under project in-




, i ∈ {m, t}.
For both types of incentives the utility is concave in the decision variable of the agents
(em or et). We also note that senior management’s utility under either incentive plan
is concave in e· so long as b ≤ 2. Thus we assume for all analysis that follows that this
condition is met. First, we solve for the case of functional incentives. For functional
incentives the equilibrium action is independent of the other agent’s actions for all




. We note that for symmetric c equilibrium effort is symmetric.
We next look at project incentives. We derive the FOC to get the best response




By symmetry we arrive at the equilibrium action (that satisfies incentive rationality)
under project incentives: e∗p =
kp
c−(b−2)kp .
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2 Note the utility of either agent given their choice
of effort: uf [kf , c, j] =
k2fi
2c
> 0, ∀kfi, c > 0 and as such the participation constraint
will never be binding for functional incentives. Thus in order for the incentive ratio-
nality to be satisfied we substitute e∗f into the firm’s profit function (and note that
kfm = kft = kf by symmetry and thus henceforth we drop the subscript i. Ad-
ditionally, we will, for clarity, make use of the following substitutions: β , b − 2
(and note the requirement that β ≤ 0), γ , 1 + 2βσ2, and ξ = 1
2
(2 − bρ)σ2 :
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βk2f + 2ckf (1− kf )− 2c2ξ
)
. Note from the first and second or-
der conditions we arrive at the condition that b ≤ 2(1 + c), which is satisfied by our
assumption of b ≤ 2. Thus for the remainder of our analysis we will assume interior
solutions and b ≤ 2(1 + c). With this condition on b satisfied, the firm profits are
concave and from the FOC we solve for the optimal incentive parameter k∗f =
c
2(1+c)−b .
We also note for future analysis that the firm’s optimal profit under functional in-
centives is ufs[b, c, σ
2]∗ = 1
2(1+c)−b − 2ξ. Now for project incentives, by inspection of
the agent’s utility that satisfies incentive rationality, up[kp, β, c, ξ] =
k2p(3c−2kpβ)
2(c−kβ)2 − 2kξ,
clearly it is possible for the participation constraint to be binding. Given such we
can formulate the lagrangian for the firm’s objective incorporating both the incentive
rationality and participation constraint (PC):










. Checking for con-





which we note is satisfied by our





. Solving for λ we obtain:
λ = 2− 2c2(1−kp)
kp(3c(c−βkp)+β2k2p)−2(c−βkp)3ξ
and substituting kp when the PC is active, λ[·] =
2(β−2c)
β−6c . ups[·] is decreasing in the variance, we solve for µ = 0 and the associ-
ated variance corresponds to the point where the participation constraint is active.
Thus, for σ2 ≤ σ̄2 = (8β−7c)(2β−5c)(ρ−2)+
√
(25c−8β)(2β−7c)2c(ρ−2)2
16β(β−2c)2(ρ−2)2 , the PC is not bind-
ing and likewise for σ2 > σ̄2 the PC is active. All we have left is to solve the
unconstrained (PC not binding) case for the firm. Given our conditions for con-
cavity, we can simply take the FOC of the firm profit function and then invoke
the implicit function theorem (IFT) to solve for kp such that kp solves G[kp, ·] =
β2γk3p − 3βcγk2p + 2c2(1 + β + γ)kp − c2(1 + 2cξ) = 0.
We note the following assumptions: i) the agent can not “sell the firm to the agents”,
nor can there be any payments rendered by the agents to the firm; ii) any fixed wage
the firm offers to the agents is not contingent on output and must be paid to the
agents (no ex-post renegotiation); iii) both agents are risk neutral (along with senior
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management); the efforts of both agents are non-verifiable, i.e. no contract can be
written (more importantly one can not be enforced) on the explicit effort of either
agent; and v) the reservation utility of the agents is zero. Thus, we claim that the
firm never optimally offers a fixed wage (i.e. one that is not contingent on output)
to the agents. First, consider functional incentives. Let ufi and ufs be the utility




fs be the specialist’s and senior manage-
ment’s (SM) utility when wf > 0. Suppose w
∗
f > 0. Note, the agents participation
constraint still never binds (yet now the agents can exert zero effort and still earn




not a function of effort). Thus u′fs = ufs − 2wf < ufs. For project incentives we
know that when the PC is not binding the same relationship as we just showed for
functional incentives holds. Now if the participation constraint is binding, offering
the agent wp > 0 is equivalent to transforming an agent with capability c into one
with capability c− 2(c−βkp)2wp
k2p
< c, which yields the firm strictly less profit. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1 Note that ufs is linearly decreasing in the σ
2.
Next we evaluate the profit when σ2 = 0. We can equate the profit under functional
incentives with σ2 = 0 with ups[kp, ·] giving us another implicit equation for kp. We
solve for k̂p, the parameter that would be required in order for the profits to be equal
and get k̂p =
(5β−8c)c
β(3B−4c) (excluding the trivial solution of k̂p = 0) and substitute k̂p into
∂ups
∂kp
and find that this is negative at kp = k̂p suggesting that the firm profits under
project incentives are always less than functional incentives. Next, we know that
the maximum project under project incentives will be such that the PC is binding.





= 1/2, we solve for
σ2pmax =
β−3c
(β−2c)2((2+β)ρ−2) . Solving for the maximum variance project under functional
incentives, we get σ2fmax =
1





since ufs is linearly decreasing in σ
2 and that ups is continuous and convex in σ
2
for non-binding PC and concave in σ2 for binding PC, there exists a crossing point
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with respect to σ2, such that above this crossing point project incentives dominate
and below functional incentives dominate. We also note that the crossing point
between functional and team incentives always occurs when the PC is non-binding
for team incentives. This can be shown by solving for the point at which ufs crosses
ups under a binding PC. Then it is straightforward to show that the variance at
which point ufs crosses ups under a binding PC is strictly less than the variance
at which point team incentives go from a non-binding constraint to a binding one.








4(β−2c)2(β−c)2 This combined with the concavity of the profit
under team incentives shows that the crossing point between functional and team
incentives strictly occurs when team incentives are non-binding. 
Corollary 1 follows directly from σ2pmax and σ
2
fmax.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2 The proof for the first claim regarding func-




The proof that project incentives are decreasing in the correlation follows from the
IFT. We define G′[kp, b, c, σ
2, ρ] = c2−4c2kp+3βck2p−β2k3p−(c−βkp)3σ2(bρ−2) which
implicitly defines k∗p when the PC is not binding. The claim has two possibilities cor-




≶ 0. We will present the argument for b > 0 where
the case of b < 0 follows the same reasoning. We prove the claim by contradiction.
Suppose that project incentives k∗p were increasing in ρ when b > 0. Let ρ
′ < ρ′′. We
know by IFT that G′[k∗p[ρ
′], ρ′, ·] = 0, and if k∗p is increasing in ρ then this would imply
that G′[k∗p[ρ
′], ρ′′, ·] > 0 which implies that ∂G′
∂ρ
> 0, but ∂G
′
∂ρ
= −bσ2(c− βk)3 and we
know from the incentive rationality and non-negativity of effort that (c − βk) > 0.
This is a contradiction. Thus, k∗p is decreasing in ρ.
In order to show that the firm profits are increasing in ρ, we begin with team in-
centives. Similar to the last claim we have two cases corresponding to b ≷ 0, and
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for consistency, we will prove the case of b > 0 where b < 0 follows the same argu-
ment. Following our convention, let ρ′ < ρ′′. Then, taking advantage of symmetry,
we can represent the optimal firm profits when ρ = ρ′ as u∗ps[k
∗
p[ρ
′, ·], ρ′, ·] = (1 −
2k∗p[ρ
′, ·])(e∗(2+βe∗)−2σ2 +bρ′σ2) and since the incentive rational effort of the agents
is independent of ρ we know that (for b > 0) u∗ps[k
∗
p[ρ
′, ·], ρ′, ·] < ups[k∗p[ρ′, ·], ρ′′, ·],
∀σ2 > 0 as a result of the direct effect of ρ. Now suppose the optimal firm profits
decreased in ρ. This would require that u∗ps[k
∗
p[ρ
′′, ·], ρ′′, ·] ≤ ups[k∗p[ρ′, ·], ρ′′, ·]. The
definition of optimality requires u∗ps[k
∗
p[ρ
′′, ·], ρ′′, ·] ≥ ups[k∗p[ρ′, ·], ρ′′, ·], the only solu-
tion to this set of inequalities is u∗ps[k
∗
p[ρ
′′, ·], ρ′′, ·] = ups[k∗p[ρ′, ·], ρ′′, ·]. Which is a
contradiction for all positive σ2. The proof for functional incentives follows the same
argument as we just posed for team incentives, but using the respective representation
of optimal profit: u∗fs[k
∗
f [ρ
′, ·], ρ′, ·] = e∗(2 + βe∗ − 2k∗f [ρ′, ·]) + ρ′σ2 − 2σ2 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3 We make use of Proposition 1 and show that the
argument for proposition 3 follows a similar argument. First we find the minimum
level of coordination that still yields non-negative utility to senior management, under
either incentive plan, i.e the marginal initiative of each feasible set. We do so under
zero correlation as from proposition 2, shows, it is straightforward to extend this ar-
gument with positive correlation, thus for clarity we use zero correlation. This yields
b given functional incentives equal to: 2 + 2c− 1
2σ2
, and b given team incentives (not-






which can easily be verified to be less than that under functional incentives. Senior
management utility under functional incentives is convex in b, while the senior man-
agement utility under a binding PC is concave in b and when the PC is non-binding
the utility is convex in b. Thus if there exists a crossing point, it will be unique. We
know from the proof of proposition 1, that if the crossing point exists it is between
the non-binding utility curve of team incentives and the utility curve of functional
incentives. Now, given these properties, we fix an initiative x̂ = (σ̂2, ρ̂), and the
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characteristics of the organization for such an initiative ŷ = (b̂, ĉ), such that it is the
marginal initiative where it yields positive utility to senior management and senior
management is indifferent between offering either a functional or team incentive plan.
Thus for initiative x̂ and organization ŷ, u∗ps = u
∗
fs = ûs. An increase in the orga-
nization’s ability to coordinate, moves to the right along each curve. Since we cross
from below with functional incentives, such a move would mean that the utility to
senior management under functional incentives is higher. Similar, with a decrease in
the coordination ability the higher utility is under team incentives. 
Asymmetric capabilities In order to investigate the effects of the dispersion
of capabilities on the firm profits and resulting choice of performance plan, we need
to restate the formulation of the firm profitability. First as we are now relaxing the
assumption of symmetry, we will forego the effect of correlation and complementarity.
Thus we now formulate the problem with two agents, one low capability and one
high capability, with the average capability (cost of effort) represented by c̄ and the
dispersion δ ∈ [0, 1) such that the low capability (who has a higher cost of effort)
is c̄(1 + δ) and the high capability is c̄(1 − δ). We also now treat project incentives
as team-based incentives whereby both agents receive the same compensation for the
project outcome.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4 Under functional incentives we can directly solve
for the firm’s optimal profit (noting that as with symmetric capabilities the PC
of the agents is never active). The firm’s optimal profits are: ufs,asym[, c̄, δ, ·] =
1+c̄





(1+c̄(2+c̄(1−δ2)))2 > 0. For project incen-
tives there are several preliminary observations to point out: the high capability
agent will never have incentives that are binding at their PC; only the low capabil-
ity agent will. This is straightforward if we simply look at the difference between
the two agents’ utility given their incentive rational effort and common incentives:




> 0, where the H and L subscripts on the utility refer to
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high and low capability, respectively. Thus to show the second and third claims, it is
sufficient to evaluate the maximum variance project for which the firm can profitably
offer project incentives. We find this project by solving for σ2pmax,asym that satisfies σ
2 :
upL[σ
2, kp = 1/2, ·] = 0 and we get that σ2pmax,asym = 2−c̄(3δ−c̄(1−δ)(3+δ)−5)8(1+c̄(1−δ))2(1+c̄(1+δ)) . Differenti-







(1+c̄(1−δ))2 − 2(1+c̄(1−δ))3 − 1(1+c̄(1+δ))2
)
.
We find where this is increasing or decreasing and note that the common denomi-
nator −(1 − c̄(1 − δ))3(1 + c̄(1 + δ))2 < 0 allows us to equivalently evaluate when
N [c̄, δ] = 1 + c̄ − c̄2 − c̄3 − c̄δ − 6c̄2δ − 5c̄3δ + 7c̄2δ2 + 5c̄3δ2 + c̄3δ3 R 0. Thus when




Q 0. Note N [·] is convex so we can find the minimum through




. Substituting δ̂ back into
N [·] we find that for c̄ . 0.607, σ2pmax,asym is decreasing in δ for all δ ∈ [0, 1); for
0.607 . c̄ < 1 for low and high δ, σ2pmax,asym is decreasing, and moderate δ it is
increasing, and for c̄ ≥ 1, σ2pmax,asym is increasing for low enough δ and decreasing for
high enough δ, where the requirement for σ2pmax,asym to be decreasing in δ is increasing
in c̄. From this the last two claims follow.
A.7. Proof of Lemma 3 We derive the expected compensation and effort ex-
penditure of either agent. Recall from Lemma 1, e∗b =
kf
c
. Thus we need to derive
k∗fL and k
∗


















− 2σ2. It can easily be checked that ufs,asym[·] is concave in
















. Thus comparing the two we
get, e∗fH > e
∗







A.8. Proof of Proposition 5 From the profit and utility derived in the prior
Lemmas, we can find the maximum profitable initiatives the firm can implement
under either incentive mechanism. ufs,asym[·] = 1+c̄2+2c̄(2+c̄(1−δ2)) − 2σ2. It follows that
σ2fmax,asym =
1+c̄
4+4c̄(2+c̄(1−δ2)) . We also can derive σ
2





0. We obtain the solution, σ2pmax,asym =
2+c̄(5−3δ+c̄(1−δ)(3+δ))
8(1+c̄(1−δ))2(1+c̄(1+δ)) . We derive the difference
as σ2pmax,asym−σ2fmax,asym = c̄(1−δ)8(1+c̄(1−δ))2 . Which is decreasing for δ > c̄−1c̄ and we note
the difference is zero as δ → 1.
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Appendix B
B.1. Proof of Proposition 6 From Definition 3 the expected profit for the VP
is: Π = θP [R]V − R − W . The VP maximizes max
R,w
θP [R]V − R − w such that:
w − kpR(1 − θP [R]) ≥ 0 (U = 0). For the problem to be well behaved (concave









−(V + kpR)/(2kp). Next, from the first order conditions we arrive at the implicit









θ(V+kpR)−(1+kp(1−θP [R]). With the participation
constraint binding the VP’s profit becomes: θP [R]V −R− kpR(1− θP [R]) and solve
for P [θ, R]: P [θ, R] =
(
(Π̂ + 1 + kp)R
)/
(V + kpR). 
Corollaries to the first-best solution are straightforward: the size of the feasible set
is reduced when either kp or Π̂ increases. Note ∂R
fb
/∂θ > 0. The proof is as






[θ]) − (1 +












> 0 ⇔ 2kp ∂P [R]∂R + (kpR + V )
∂2P [R]
∂R2
< 0, where the
R.H.S. condition represents the condition for concavity. 
B.2. Proof of Proposition 7 The VP has two options (or any combination
of the two): w and ks. The VP must meet the participation constraint of the
PM. The worst case is: θd. When w is offered she offers w = kpR(1 − θdP [R])
(i.e highest expected penalty). If the VP chooses to use ks, ks must be set where
ksθdP [R](V −R)−kpR(1−θdP [R]) = 0, or ks = (kpR(1− θdP [R]))/ (θdP [R](V −R)).
Clearly, when θ = θd both forms of compensation are equivalent (i.e. for any wage
there is an equivalent ks that offers both manager and VP the same expected utility).
For θ 6= θd, this does not hold. Specifically, for θe > θd, w and ks remain the same
(w = kpR(1 − θdP [R]) and ks = (kpR(1− θdP [R]))/ (θdP [R](V −R)). Then Π[θe]
becomes:
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(under fixed wage) θeP [R]V −R− kpR(1− θdP [R]), and under
(profit-sharing) (1 − kpR(1−θdP [R])
θdP [R](V−R)
)θeP [R](V − R) − R(1 − θeP [R]). Subtracting the
latter from the former we get: Rkp(1−θdP [R])(θeP [R]−θdP [R])
θdP [R]
, which is both positive and
increasing as the θ becomes greater than θd. Thus, it is always better to implement
a fixed wage.
Recall that we normalize θe = 1, so Π = (qθd + (1− q))P [R]V − R − kpθdR(1 −








< − 2kpθdE[θ]V+Rkpθd ,
which is satisfied by the conditions imposed on the first-best scenario. We solve for R
∗
using the first order conditions: R
∗















[R] = −1 − kp(1 − E[θ]P [R]) +
∂P [R]
∂R
E[θ] (V +Rkp) for θ = E[θ], thus R
∗























































F td < Ffb follows directly from the fact that R∗ [E[θ]] < Rfb [E[θ]], since for any E[θ] :
Π
fb
= 0⇒ Πtd < 0 since R∗ [E[θ]] < Rfb [E[θ]] and trivially Π[R] < Π[Rfb ]∀R < Rfb 
B.3. Proof of Proposition 8 The PM knows θ, the VP does not, and has
no way to verify θ ex-post. A fixed wage implies the PM’s objective is: max
R
w −
kpR(1 − θP [R]). This has a maximum at R = 0 since w − kpR(1 − θP [R]) < w
forallR > 0 (only when lim
R→∞
w− kpR(1− θP [R])→ w). In order to induce non-zero
R, the VP uses profit-sharing with parameter ks, with reservation utility at 0, and








2(R−V θP [R]) ∂P [R]
∂R
R(V−R) Note that the PM’s resource allocation choice is influenced by the









1− θP [R]−Rθ ∂P [R]
∂R
)








θ(P [R]+(V−R) ∂P [R]∂R )
. Substituting k∗s into the first order conditions for a PM realizing
θ = θd yields:
kp
(





, which yields the implicit solution
for R
∗
d that solves: −V P [Rd] + V P [Rd]2 θd + (V −Rd)Rd ∂P [Rd]∂R = 0, or equivalently:
∂P [Rd]
∂R
= V P [Rd](1−θdP [Rd])
(V−Rd)Rd
. Likewise the utility for the PM realizing θ = θe yields first
order conditions (after substituting k∗s):




, which yields the
implicit solution for R
∗
e :










1− V ∂P [Re]
∂R
))
= 0, or equivalently:
∂P [Re]
∂R =
P [Re](V θdP [Rd]−Rd)−P [Rd](V−Rd)θd













) , equating this solution to that of the PM’s we can clearly see that they are
equal when θd =
R(1+kp)
P [R](V+Rkp)




d. In fact this clearly follows from the












B.4. Proof of Theorem 9 For such a setting we claim that for any organization
with a tolerance for failure kp < k̄p there exists a crossing point between the profitabil-
ity under a top-down process and that under a full-empowerment one. The proof fol-






















) . Note, that when Πfe = qΠfe [θd] + (1 − q)Πfe [θe] and
Π
fb
[θ∗∗d ] = Π
fe
[θ∗∗d ] then the only loss occurs as a result of the need to offer incentives
k∗s =
kpR[θd](1−θdP [R[θd]])
θdP [R[θd]](V−R[θd]) , where the firm would rather offer a fixed wage, or equivalent
k′s =
kpR[θd](1−P [R[θd]]θd)
P [R[θe]](V−R[θe]) , resulting in a loss of:







(V −R [θe]). R∗d that solves:
∂P [Rd]
∂R =
V P [Rd](1−θdP [Rd])





P [Re](V θdP [Rd]−Rd)−P [Rd](V−Rd)θd

























(V − R [θe])
)
. Clearly











we know that when θd → θe = 1 ⇒ Π
td → Πfb and Πfe < Πfb . Then from continuity
in the profit functions, for q > q̂, kp < k̄p and Π
fe
[θ∗∗d ] > Π
td
[θ∗∗d ] there exists some θ
′
d,








d < 1. We next look at the equivalence be-












⇒ V P [Rd[θd]](1−P [Rd[θd]]θd)(V−Rd[θd])Rd[θd] =
1+kp−P [Rd[θd]]kpθd













Q = V 4 (q + (1− q)P [Rd])2−4qV 3Rd+2V 2 (2q − (2− q − (1− q)P [Rd]) kp)R2d+4V kpR3d+
k2pR
4






















B.5. Proof of Proposition 10 The compensation decision is the same exact logic
as for top-down resource allocation. The firm profit satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees (Laf-









which equates to ∂∂θ
(
1− θV ∂P [R]∂R
)
= −V ∂P [R]∂R < 0, which clearly satisfies the condi-
tion. Only local incentive compatibility needs to be checked. Due to the monotonic-





∂θ > 0. Similarly,
∂w
∗
∂θ > 0. In order to create an incentive
feasible separating contract (Laffont and Martimort, 2001, p. 90.) the following con-
straints must hold (by the Revelation Principle): (i)/, w∗θd = kpR
∗
θd
(1 − θdP [R∗θd ]) and
(ii)/, w∗θe − kpR∗θe(1 − θeP [R∗θe ]) = w∗θd − kpR
∗
θd
(1 − θeP [R∗θd ]). We can then represent wθd
as wθd = kpRθd (1− P [Rθd ] θd) and
wθe as wθe = kp (P [Rθd ]Rθd (θe − θd) +Rθe (1− P [Rθe ] θe)). Then the VP’s objective be-
comes (substituting wθd and wθe :
max
Rθd ,Rθe
q (θdP [Rθd ]V −Rθd − kpRθd (1− θdP [Rθd ]))
+(1− q) (θeP [Rθe ]V −Rθe − kp (P [Rθd ]Rθd (θe − θd) +Rθe (1− P [Rθe ] θe)))
.




1 + kp (1− P [Rθe ] θe)− (V + kpRθe) θeP ′ [Rθe ] = 0 or equivalently:
P [Rθe ] =
1+kp−(V+kpRθe )θeP ′[Rθe ]
kpθe
which is the same solution as the first best. Similarly, the




q (1− V θdP ′ [Rθd ]) + kp (q + ((1− q)θe − θd) (P [Rθd ] +RθdP ′ [Rθd ])) = 0, or equivalently
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R∗θd solves
P [Rθd ] =
q(1−V θdP ′[Rθd ])+kp(q−Rθd (θd−(1−q)θe)P
′[Rθd ])
kp(θd−(1−q)θe) , where Rθd < R
fb
[θd]. The corollary
follows since without any implementation cost, adding an additional lever (the ability to
adapt the specific fixed wage allows any of the other contracts to be replicated with that
presented above thus by optimality the optimal contract must be at least as good as any of
the prior contracts presented. 
B.5a. Proof of Theorem 11 It is straightforward to see that when the firm can
adjust wθd and wθe as well as the resource levels, any solution to a top-down or bottom-up
process can be replicated. It should be clear that if we construct the solution to the tailored
incentive and compensation such that the firm earns Π
tc













, which would render it sub-
optimal for all initiatives. 
B.6. Proof of Proposition 12 Again, the compensation decision follows the exact
same logic as in the top-down resource allocation. The following constraints must hold: (i)
w−kpRθd(1−θdP [Rθd ]) ≥ 0 (ii) w−kpRθe(1−θeP [Rθe ]) ≥ 0 (iii) w−kpRθe(1−θeP [Rθe ]) ≥
w − kpRθd(1 − θeP [Rθd ]) (iv)w − kpRθd(1 − θdP [Rθd ]) ≥ w − kpRθe(1 − θdP [Rθe ]). These
reduce to: (i) w ≥ kpRθd(1−θdP [Rθd ]) (ii) w ≥ kpRθe(1−θeP [Rθe ]) (iii)Rθe(1−θeP [Rθe ]) ≤
Rθd(1 − θeP [Rθd ]) (iv) Rθd(1 − θdP [Rθd ]) ≤ Rθe(1 − θdP [Rθe ]). Note that if both (iii) and
(iv) are binding then the only solution is that Rθe = Rθd . Note the following properties:
R(1 − θP [R]) obtains a unique maximum (R̂) on R+ and is monotonically decreasing for
R > R̂ ( ∂∂RR(1− θP [R]) = 1−P [R]−R
∂P [R]




R ⇒ ∀R > R̂
R(1− θP [R]) is decreasing). Now note there are three potential cases: (a) (i) and (iii) are
binding and all other constraints are slack, (b) (i) is binding and all other constraints are
binding, or (c) all constraints bind in which case Rθd = Rθd and the allocations reduce to the






(note that α[θ] is decreasing in θ). Then, we can represent Rθd =
α[θ]Rθe . It follows that: (iii) binds when α[θ] < α̂, where α̂ solves αRθe (1− P [αRθe ]) =
Rθe (1− P [Rθe ]), and is slack for α[θ] > α̂. Thus for low θ (iii) is binding and for higher θ it
is not. Next note that (iv) binds if Rθd (1− θdP [Rθd ]) = Rθe (1− θdP [Rθe ]) which occurs
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for θd ≥ θ̂d =
Rθe−Rθd
P [Rθe ]Rθe−P [Rθd ]Rθd
. Note that R such that (iii) binds is less than R such that
(iv) binds (the condition amounts to: (1− P [R])R < (1− θP [R])R, which holds). Next we
show that θ̂d < 1 which implies that (iv) is binding for θ < 1 and then remains binding
for θ ∈ [θ̂, 1], which then implies that Rθd = Rθe over this same interval, which implies
that resource buckets reduce to the top-down process for this interval and this also gives
us an ordering: low θ implies constrained (by (iii) ) moderate θ allows for unconstrained
solutions, and higher θ reduces to top-down. 
B.7. Proof of Theorem 13 Follows directly from the proof above since θ̂ < θe = 1.
Alternatively the replication between the full-empowerment and strategic buckets can be
seen as follows:
Trivially any top-down process can be replicated with a strategic buckets process. Simi-
larly, for two types any full-empowerment process can be represented by an appropriately
constructed strategic buckets process. Denoting the respective resource bucket and full-
empowerment allocations by Rb,θ and Rf,θ, as we have seen before the contributions from
the difficult task realization are the same when Rb,θd = Rf,θd since Πb,θd = θdP [Rb,θd ]V −
Rb,θd − kpRb,θd(1 − P [Rb,θd ]) = Πf,θd = (1 −
Rb,θd (1−θdP [Rb,θd ])
(V−Rb,θd )θdP [Rb,θd ]
)θdP [Rb,θd ](V − Rb,θd) −
Rb,θd(1 − P [Rb,θd ]) when Rb,θd = Rf,θd . Then we need to find Rb,θe such that Πf,θe =
(1 − Rb,θd (1−θdP [Rb,θd ])(V−Rb,θd )θdP [Rb,θd ])P [Rf,θe ](V − Rf,θe) − Rf,θe(1 − P [Rf,θe ]) = Πf,θe = P [Rf,θe ]V −
Rf,θe − kpRb,θd(1− P [Rb,θd ]) ⇒ P [Rb,θe ] =
Rb,θe−Rf,θe+kpRb,θd (1−θdP [Rb,θd ])+Rf,θeP [Rf,θe ]+








B.8. An example of strategic buckets with three types
If we solve for the top-down, full-empowerment and the strategic buckets solutions for
the case of kp = 0.01, q = 1/2, θd = .3, V = 8, P [R] =
R2
1+R2









[θd] = 1.02992, R
fe














= 2.23012. For the example below
kp = 0.01, q = 1/2. Here for the case of moderate difficulty, the full-empowerment RAP
dominates that of the strategic buckets RAP.
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Region where a Full-Empowerment RAP 
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Figure 18: An example to show that when strategic buckets are defined with finer




C.1. Instructions offered to subjects for both the Individual and Shared Control
Groups.
Figure 19: The introduction shown to subjects in the shared control group.
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Figure 20: The introduction shown to subjects in the shared control group.
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Figure 21: Qualification questions given to subjects in the shared control group.
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Figure 22: Qualification questions given to subjects in the shared control group.
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C.2. Calculating the Coefficient of Risk Aversion.
The procedure used to calculate the coefficient of risk aversion is similar to the one
used in other studies of decision-making under risk. Recall that we used a power utility,
U(V ) = V a, and we assumed that each subject made a utility maximizing decision. The
subject’s problem is to choose the resource allocation level r∗ that maximizes his expected





(α(v − r))a − θ
θ + r
(βr)a
where we have substituted the functional form for the probability of success: p(r) = r/(θ+r).
Based on our assumption that the subjects act optimally, we use the observed empirical
value for each subject’s resource decision, r̃, and derive an estimate of the coefficient of risk
aversion, â, as follows:




(α(v − r))a − θ
θ + r
(βr)a
As an example, consider the case where α = 1, β = 1, θ = 15, v = 1000 and r̃ = 200.
This corresponds to high reward, high penalty, low-risk project, and an observed resource
decision of 10 (each unit resource presented to the subject represents an increment of 20
resources). It is straightforward to verify that a â = 0.377 for this example.
120
REFERENCES
Aghion, P., J. Tirole. 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. The Journal of
Political Economy. 105 (1), pp. 1-29
Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. 2005. Identity and the Economics of Organizations, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 9-32.
Allen, Thomas J. 1985. Managing the Flow of Technology. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press
Anderson, E. and N. Joglekar. 2005. A Hierarchical Product Development Planning
Framework. Production and Operations Management. 14 (3), pp. 344-361
Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. and Vesterlund, L. 2003. The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards,
Punishment, and Cooperation. American Economic Review. Vol. 93, No. 3, p. 893.
Antle, R. and G.D. Eppen. 1985. Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital
Budgeting. Management Science. 31 (2), pp. 163-174
Baiman, S. and M.V. Rajan. 1995. Centralization, delegation, and shared responsibility in
the assignment of capital investment decision rights. Journal of Accounting Research.
33, pp. 135-164
Baker, G.P., M.C. Jensen, and K.J. Murphy. 1988. Compensation and Incentives:
Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance. 43 (3), pp. 593-616
Balasubramanian, S. and Bhardwaj, P. 2004. When Not All Conflict Is Bad:
Manufacturing-Marketing Conflict and Strategic Incentive Design. Management
Science. 50 (4)
Bhaskaran, S.R. and V. Krishnan. 2009. Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms
for Collaborative New Product Development. Management Science. 55 (7)
Birnbaum, M.H. and Bahra, J.P. 2007. Gain-Loss Separability and Coalescing in Risky
Decision Making Management Science 53 (6) p. 1016-1028
Bolton, G. and Zwick, R. 1995. Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining.
Games and Economic Behavior. Vol. 10, No 1, p. 95-121.
Bonner, S.E. and Sprinkle, G.B. 2002. The effects of monetary incentives on effort and
121
task performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting,
Organizations and Society 27 (4-5), p. 303-345.
Bower, J. 1970. Managing the Resource Allocation Process: A Study of Corporate
Planning and Investment. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA.
Bower, J.L. and C.G. Gilbert. 2005. From Resource Allocation to Strategy. Oxford
University Press, New York.
Bower, J.L. and Y.L. Doz. 1979. Strategic Management: A New View of Business Policy
and Planning. In D.E. Schendel and C.W. Hofer. Strategic Management: A New View
of Business Policy and Planning. Little, Brown and Company, Inc., Boston.
Burgelman, R. 1983. A Model of the Interaction of the Strategic Behavior, Corporate
Context, and the Concept of Strategy. The Academy of Management Review 8 (1),
pp. 61-70
Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Cameron, J. .2001. Negative Effects of Reward on Intrinsic Motivation–A Limited
Phenomenon: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 2001. Review of Educational
Research, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 29.
Cameron, J. and Pierce, D. 1994. Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A
Meta-Analysis. Review of Educational Research. Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 363-423
Chandrasekaran, A. and Mishra, A. 2010. Structure, Context, and Psychological Safety:
An Empirical Analysis of R&D Projects in High Technology Organizations. Ohio
State University - Fisher College of Business Working Paper.
Chao, R.O. and S. Kavadias 2008. A Theoretical Framework for Managing the NPD
Portfolio: When and How to Use Strategic Buckets.Management Science. 54 (5), pp.
907-921
Chao, R.O. and S. Kavadias 2009. Organization Structure, Incentives, and the Innovation
Portfolio. Presentation, INFORMS Annual Conference. San Diego, CA.
Chao, R.O., S. Kavadias and C. Gaimon 2009. Revenue Driven Resource Allocation:
Funding Authority, Incentives and NPD Portfolio Management. Management Science.
55 (9), pp. 1556-1569
122
Charness, G. and Gneezy, U. 2010. Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment.
Economic Inquiry. Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 133-146.
Chassang, S. 2010. Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of
Incomplete Relational Contracts. The American Economic Review. 100(1), pp.
448-465
Clark, K. and Fujimoto, T. 1991. Product development performance: Strategy,
organization, and management in the world auto industry. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Clark, K. and Wheelwright, S. 1992. Organizing and Leading Heavyweight Development
Teams. California Management Review. Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 9-28.
Clark, R.D. 1974. Risk Taking in Groups: A Social Psychological Analysis. Journal of
Risk and Insurance 41 (1) p. 75-92
Clark, R.D., Crockett, W.H., and Archer, R.L. 1971. Risk-as-Value Hypothesis: The
Relationship Between Perception of Self, Others, and the Risky Shift. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology. 20 (3) p. 425-429
Coen, C.A. and C.A. Maritan. 2010. Investing in Capabilities: The Dynamics of Resource
Allocation. Forthcoming in Organization Science.
Cooper, R.G., S. J. Edgett and E.J. Kleinschmidt. 2001. Portfolio Management for New
Products 2nd Edition. Perseus Books, Mass.
Cowgill, B. and Zitzewitz, E. 2009. Incentive Effects of Equity Compensation: Employee
Level Evidence from Google. Dartmouth University - Department of Economics
Working Paper.
Deci, E., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. 1999. A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, Psychological
Bulletin. Vol. 125, No. 6, p. 627-668.
DeHoratius, N. and Raman, A. 2007. Store Manager Incentive Design and Retail
Performance: An Exploratory Investigation. Manufacturing and Service Operations
Management. Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 518-534.
Dickinson, D. 2001. The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation. Experimental
123
Economics. Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 107.
Dutta, S., O. Narasimhan and S. Rajiv. 1999. Success in High-Technology Markets: Is
Marketing Capability Critical? Marketing Science 18 (4)
Ederer, F. and Manso, G. 2010. Is Pay-for-Performance Detrimental to Innovation? UC
Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper No. 936643.
Edlund, J., Sagarin, B., Skowronski, J., Johnson, S., Kutter, J. 2009. Whatever happens
in the laboratory stays in the laboratory: The prevalence and prevention of
participant crosstalk. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Vol. 35, p. 635-642.
Eisenhardt, K. 1985. Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches. Management
Science. Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 134-149.
Eisenhardt, K. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Management Science
14 (1) p. 57-74.
Erat, S. and S. Kavadias. 2008. Sequential testing of Product designs: Implications for
Learning. Management Science. 54 (5)
Erat, S. and V. Krishnan. 2010. Managing Delegated Search Over Design Spaces. UCSD
Working Paper. SSRN: Abstract id: 1567599
Eustace, A. 2009. Investing in Innovation at Google, available at http://googleblog.
blogspot. com/ 2009/11/ investing-in-innovation-at-google.html.
Fehr, E., A. Klein, and K.N. Schmidt. 2007. Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica.
75 (1), pp. 121-154
Feltham, G. and J. Xie 1994. Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in
Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations. The Accounting Review. 69 (3)
Ford, R. and Randolph, W.A. 1992. Cross-Functional Structures: A Review and
Integration of Matrix Organization and Project Management. Journal of
Management. Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 267.
Galbraith, J. 1973. Designing Complex Organiztions, Addison-Wesley Longman
Publishing Company, Boston, MA.
Galbraith, J. 1977. Organizational Design, Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing
Company, Boston, MA.
124
Gibbons, R. 2005. Incentives Between Firms (and Within), Management Science. Vol. 51,
No. 1, p. 2-17.
Gibbons, R. 2005. Incentives in Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12 (4)
p. 115-132.
Gneezy, U. and Potters, J. 1997. An Experiment On Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, p. 631-645.
Griffin, A. and J. Hauser. 1996. Integrating R&D and marketing: a review and analysis of
the literature. The Journal of Product Innovation Management. 13 (3)
Griffin, A. and J. Hauser. 1993. The Voice of the Customer. Marketing Science 12 (1)
p.1-27.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. 1983. An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem,
Econometrica. Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 7-45.
Gupta, A.K., S.P. Raj, D. Wilemon. 1986. A Model for Studying R&D. Marketing
Interface in the Product Innovation Process. Journal of Marketing. 50 (4)
Hamilton, B.H., J.A. Nickerson and H. Owan. 2003. Team Incentives and Worker
Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and
Participation. Journal of Political Economy. 111 (3)
Hamner, W.C. 1974. “Reinforcement Theory and Contingency Management in
Organizational Settings,” in Henry L. Tosi and W. Clay Hamner (Eds.),
Organizational Behavior and Management: A Contingency Approach. Chicago, IL: St.
Clair Press, 86-112.
Hamner, W.C. 2005. “Operant Behavior And Organizational Behavior Modification”, in
J.B. Miner, Organizational Behavior 1: Essential Theories of Motivation and
Leadership. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York. P. 114-133.
Harris, M., C.H. Kriebel, and A. Raviv. 1982. Asymmetric Information, Incentives and
Intrafirm Resource Allocation. Management Science. 28 (6), pp. 604-620
Hart, O. and J. Moore. 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica. 56
(4)
Hauser, J. 1998. Research, Development and Engineering Metrics. Management Science
125
44 (12), pp. 1670-1689
Hermalin, B. 2008. Leadership and Corporate Culture. Forthcoming in R. Gibbons and J.
Roberts (eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Hermalin, B. 2001. An Economists View of Corporate Culture. in Handbook of Corporate
Culture, Forthcoming.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics.
Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. The Bell Journal of Economics. 13 (2) p.
324-340.
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. The Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 7
Holt, C. and Laury, S. 2002. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic
Review. Vol. 92, No. 5, p. 1644-1655.
Holt, C. and S. Laury. 2005. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data Without
Order Effects. American Economic Review 95 (3) p. 902-904.
Hsee, C.K., and E.U. Weber. 1997. A Fundamental Prediction Error: Self-Others
Discrepancies in Risk Preference. Journal of Experimental Psychology 126 (1) p.
45-53.
Huchzermeier, A. and C.H. Loch. 2001. Project management under risk: Using the real
options approach to evaluate flexibility in R&D. Management Science. 47 (1), pp.
85-101
Ichniowski, C., K. Shaw and G. Prennushi. 1997. The Effects of Human Resource
Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines. The
American Economic Review 87 (3)
Jensen, M.C, and W.H. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3 (4)
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk. Econometrica. Vol. 47, No. 2, p. 263-292.
126
Katok, E. and E. Siemsen 2009. The Influence of Career Concerns on Task Choice:
Experimental Evidence. Working Paper.
Kaplan, S. and R. Henderson. 2005. Inertia and Incentives: Bridging Organizational
Economics and Organizational Theory. Organization Science 16 (5) p. 509-521
Kim, O. and M. Walker. 1984. The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence. Public
Choice 43 p. 3-24.
Kavadias, S. and J. Kovach 2010. Innovation at Cooper Lighting: Continuous
Improvement of the Innovation Process:Georgia Institute of Technology Case Study.
Kornish, L.J. and K.T. Ulrich. 2010. Opportunity Spaces in Innovation: Empirical
Analysis of Large Samples of Ideas.forthcoming in Management Science.
Kreps, D. M. 1990. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. in J. E. Alt and K. A.
Shepsle., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, England.
Laffont, J.L. and D. Martimort. 2001. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N.J.
Lazear, E. 1991. Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations. Journal of
Economic Perspectives. Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 89-110.
Lazear, E. (1995). Personnel Economics. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.
Lazear, E. 1996. Performance Pay and Productivity. American Economic Review. 90 (5)
p. 1346-1361.
Lazear, E. 2000. The Power of Incentives. American Economic Review. Vol. 90, No. 2, p.
410.
Lazear, E. and P. Oyer. (2008). Personnel Economics. Working Paper.
Lazear, E. and Shaw K. 2007. Personnel Economics: The Economist’s View of Human
Resources. NBER Working Paper No. 13653.
Levy, H. 1994. Absolute and relative risk aversion: An experimental study. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty. 8 (3) p. 289-307.
Loch, C.H. and S. Kavadias 2010. Implementing Strategy Through Project Portfolios. in
Morris P., Pinto J. and Soderlund J. (eds.) Oxford Handbook in the Management of
127
Projects.
Loch, C.H. and S. Kavadias. 2002. Dynamic Portfolio Selection of NPD Programs Using
Marginal Returns. Management Science. 48 (10), pp. 1227-1241
Loch, C. and S. Tapper. 2001. Implementing a strategy-driven performance measurement
system for an applied research group. Journal of Product Innovation Management.
Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 185-198.
Loch, C.H. and C. Terwiesch. 2008. “Coordination in Product Development” in
Handbook of New Product Development Management, C. Loch and S. Kavadias, Eds.
Butterworth/Heinemann, New York, NY.
Manso, G. 2011. Motivating Innovation. Journal of Finance. Forthcoming.
Maritan, C.A. 2001. Capital Investment as Investing in Organizational Capabilities: An
Empirically Grounded Process Model. Academy of Management Journal. 44 (3), pp.
513-531
Markowitz, H. 1952.. Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance.7 (1), pp. 77-91
McClelland, D. C., J.W. Atkinson, R.A. Clark, and E.L. Lowell. 1953. “The achievement
motive”. Appleton-Century-Crofts., New York, NY
Mihm, J. 2010. Incentives in New Product Development Projects and the Role of Target
Costing. Management Science. Vol 56, No. 8, p. 1324.
Mihm, J., C. H. Loch and A. Huchzermeier. (2003). Problem Solving Oscillations in
Complex Engineering Projects. Management Science 49 (6)
Mihm, J., C.H. Loch, D. Wilkinson, and B.A. Huberman. 2010. Hierarchical Structure
and Search in Complex Organizations. Management Science. 56 (5), pp. 831-848
Miner, J.B. 2005. Organizational Behavior 1: Essential Theories of Motivation and
Leadership. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York.
Mishra, A. and Shah, R. 2009. In union lies strength: Collaborative competence in new
product development and its performance effects. Journal of Operations Management.
Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 324-338.
Moorthy, K.S. (1984). Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line Design.
Marketing Science. 3 (4).
128
Oraiopoulos, N. and S. Kavadias. (2008). The Role of Informational Spillovers on
Competitive R&D Search. Georgia Institute of Technology Working Paper.
Orne, M.T. 1962. On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With
particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American
Psychologist. Vol. 17, p. 776-783
Ouchi, W. 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organization control
mechanisms. Management Science. Vol. 25, p. 833-848.
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J. and Ipeirotis, P. 2010. Running experiments on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making. Vol. 5, No. 5, p. 411.
Plambeck, E. and Zenios, S. 2000. Performance-Based Incentives in a Dynamic
Principal-Agent Model. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. Vol. 2,
No. 3, p. 240-263.
Porter, L.W., and E.E. Lawler. 1968. Managerial Attitudes and Performance. Homewood,
IL: Irwin.
Prendergast, C. 1999. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic
Literature. Vol. 37, p. 7-63.
Roussel, P. A., K.N. Saad, and T.J. Erickson. 1991. Third Generation R&D. Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Sarin, S. and V. Mahajan. (2001). The Effect of Reward Structures on the Performance of
Cross-Functional Product Development Teams. Journal of Marketing. 65 (4)
Schein, E. H. 2010. Organizational Culture and Leadership. 4th Edition Jossey-Bass
Publishers, San Francisco, CA.
Sevillano, J. 2011. Personal communication with Julian Sevillano, Senior Strategic
Planning Manager, Visa Inc.
Siemsen, E. 2008. The Hidden Perils of Career Concerns in R&D Organizations.
Management Science. Vol. 54, No. 5, p. 863-877.
Siemsen, E., S. Balasubramanian, and A. Roth. 2007. Incentives that induce task-related
effort, helping, and knowledge sharing in workgroups. Management Science. 53 (10) p.
1533-1550.
129
Skinner, B.F. 1953. Science and Human Behavior. Macmillan , New York.
Smith, J.E. and R.F. Nau. 1995. Valuing Risky Projects: Option Pricing Theory and
Decision Analysis. Management Science 41 (5) p. 795-816.
Sosa, M and Mihm, J. 2008. Organization Design for New Product Development. in
Handbook of New Product Development Management, C. Loch and S. Kavadias, Eds.
Butterworth/Heinemann, New York, NY.
Souder, W.E. 1981. Disharmony Between R&D and Marketing. Industrial Marketing
Management. 10
Souder, W.E. and A.K. Chakrabarti. 1978. The R&D/Marketing Interface: Results from
an Empirical Study of Innovation Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management. EM-25 (4)
Sting, F. and C.H. Loch. 2009. How Top-Down and Bottom-Up Strategy Processes are
Combined in Manufacturing Organizations. INSEAD Working paper.
Sutter, M. 2007. Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on
individual versus team investment behavior. Economic Letters. Vol. 97, No. 2, p.
128-132.
Swink, M. 2006. Building Collaborative Innovation Capability. Research Technology
Management. Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 37-47.
Terwiesch, C. and C. Loch. 2004. Collaborative Prototyping and the Pricing of
Custom-Designed Products. Management Science 50 (2) p. 145-158.
Terwiesch, C. and K.T. Ulrich. 2008. Managing the Opportunity Portfolio. Research
Technology Management., pp 27-38
Terwiesch, C. and K.T. Ulrich. 2009. Innovation Tournaments. Harvard Business Press.
Boston, MA.
Terwiesch, C. and Y. Xu. 2008. Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent
Problem Solving. Management Science. 54 (9), pp. 1529-1543
Tian, X. and Wang, T. 2009. Tolerance for Failure and Corporate Innovation. Indiana
University - Kelley School of Business Working Paper.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of
130
choice. Science. Vol. 211, No. 4481, p. 453-458.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. Vol. 5, No. 4, p.
297-323.
Ulrich, K. and Eppinger, S. 2004. Product Design and Development, McGraw-Hill/Irwin,
New York, NY.
Van den Steen, E. 2010. On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture).
Forthcoming in RAND Journal of Economics.
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. 1953. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
Third Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
Vroom, V.H. 1964. Work and Motivation. Wiley , New York.
Weiner, B. 1992. An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion.
Psychological Review 92 (4) p. 548-573.
Wheelwright, S.C. and K.B. Clark. 1992. Revolutionizing Product Development: Quantum
Leaps in Speed, Efficiency, and Quality. The Free Press. New York, NY.
Wu, G. and Markle, A. 2008. An Empirical Test of Gain-Loss Separability in Prospect
Theory. Management Science. Vol. 54, No. 7, p. 1322-1335.
Zingales, L. and R.G. Rajan. 2001. The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the
Origins and Growth of Firms with. Quarterly Journal Economics, pp. 805-851
131
